Asia is represented in the G20 by six countries — Australia, China, India, Indonesia, Korea, and Japan.

In addition to pursuing a bilateral agenda, say with the US or the EU, how can the Asian members of the G20 jointly synergise and leverage their growing economic and political clout into more effective participation in the G20? How can Asia collectively strengthen its voice in the G20?

Asia can strengthen its position in three ways.

First, Asia should realise the centrality of ASEAN in Asia’s regional architecture, and should lobby to formalise the membership of ASEAN representatives in the G20. Under the present G20 practice of inviting representatives of regional groupings, the ASEAN chair and the ASEAN secretary general participated at the London and Pittsburgh summits. The ASEAN Leaders’ Statement from the ASEAN Hanoi summit of April 2010 states: ‘ASEAN strongly believes that it can contribute to the deliberations of the G20 through the continued participation of the ASEAN chair and the ASEAN secretary general in the future G20 summits.’  But convention is not enough. Strong diplomatic efforts are required by Asian countries to formalise and regularise the participation of ASEAN representatives in future G20 Summits.

Second, Asian countries should organise meetings of the ‘expanded’ ASEAN+3 prior to the G20 summits so as to coordinate policies and develop common views. After the Asian financial crisis, a number of fora for policy coordination were established. These included the Executives’ Meeting of East Asian and Pacific Central Bankers and the ASEAN Surveillance Process. Among them, the most comprehensive, and the one with the strongest technical support, is the ASEAN+3 Economic Review and Policy Dialogue (ERPD), which brings together the finance ministers and deputies of 13 countries (ASEAN plus China, Japan, and Korea). A system to monitor financial sector vulnerabilities and early warning systems of banking and financial crises has also been established. Singapore recently announced it would establish an ASEAN+3 Macroeconomic Research Office by May 2011 to support the ASEAN+3 ERPD.

Reflecting their growing economic weight and linkages with other countries in the region, India, Australia and New Zealand should be invited by the ASEAN+3 to join their policy coordination meetings. The deliberations of the expanded ASEAN+3 prior to the G20 summits would provide a robust agenda for the ASEAN representatives to table at the next summit.

Third, Asian countries should coordinate their views with those of developing countries in other regions of the world by joining and supporting the informal Good Governance Group (or the 3G), convened by Singapore under the auspices of the United Nations. This group currently comprises about 24 small and medium states from around the world (of which six are from Asia — Brunei, Malaysia,  New Zealand, the Philippines, Singapore and Vietnam), which have come together to develop a constructive dialogue on coordination and cooperation between G20 and non-G20 members. The 3G has put forward several important ideas in a UN document, such as the proposal that the G20 should undertake consultations as widely as possible with non-G20 members before the G20 summits. Additionally, the UN Secretary General should be an active participant in all aspects of the G20 process. It suggests that the G20 should take on a ‘variable geometry’ configuration to allow non-G20 states to participate in ministerial and other gatherings and other working groups involving senior officials and experts on specialised issues. Finally, the G20 should continue the practice of inviting established regional groupings to the summits.

The G20 has provided a historically unprecedented opportunity for Asian countries to be heard on the reform of international monetary and financial architecture and other issues. The onus is now on the Asian countries to deliver.

Pradumna B. Rana is an associate professor at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University in Singapore.