Countries in the Global South are becoming increasingly important actors on the global stage. While the term ‘Global South’ is vague — and some have argued for abolishing it — it is used here to mean the larger and richer developing nations. The demands made by the Global South have created political and economic shifts that the West will need to adapt to.
These countries have become more powerful due to their economic growth. With respect to GDP in purchasing power parity-adjusted terms, India is the third largest economy globally, while Indonesia is seventh and Brazil is eighth. Meanwhile, the G7’s share of global GDP has fallen from 65 to 44 per cent over the last 50 years due in part to China’s rise but also to the rise of the Global South.
The Global South is using its power by trying to exert agency in international economic and political affairs. One manifestation is the call for ‘active non-alignment’ between the United States and China. This is not the non-alignment of the 20th century, but one that shifts alliances depending on the issue at stake. A recent example is Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. While most developing countries disapprove of the invasion, they are unwilling to participate in sanctions despite the West’s urging. Another example is Southeast Asia balancing close economic relations with China against security relations with the United States.
Yet there are obstacles to the Global South assuming a substantially greater international political role. The interests of individual countries are quite heterogeneous, varying by geographical location, size, natural resource endowment and development level. For instance, China’s neighbours in Southeast Asia are in quite a different situation than Latin American countries in the US sphere of influence. Likewise, a giant like India is unlikely to share the same world outlook as a smaller Chile. Natural resource exporters have different interests than exporters of industrial goods.
There is also a lack of leadership within the Global South. While we might assume that the BRICS — Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa and six other recently added members — would form the leadership core, the presence of China complicates that assumption. If the Global South seeks to locate itself between the United States and China and draw resources from both, having China as part of the leadership is a contradiction. Until an ‘indigenous’ leadership emerges, the Global South cannot effectively engage in active non-alignment.
The implications of a substantially more powerful Global South can be understood by looking at the demands that come from organisations associated with the Global South, including BRICS and the Group of 77. Currently, the Global South is demanding a greater role in existing international institutions, especially the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the UN Security Council, as well as greater equality in the division of international resources. The issue on the international agenda at the moment is the demand for a ‘loss and damage’ fund as part of the climate negotiations.
Overall, a larger international role for the Global South is likely to make decision-making more difficult, as already seen in the World Trade Organization and the UN General Assembly. It also seems likely that a greater role for the Global South would mean a greater role for China given its successful courtship of many Global South countries.
From the view of long-run stability, the West should support the current demands to give the Global South a stake in the current world system. The West should support a greater role for the Global South in international financial institutions and the UN. One step in that direction was the creation of the G20, but more permanent participation is called for. The quid pro quo of greater participation could be an agreement on an agenda for the coming decade and rules of operation for international organisations.
The West should initiate steps on resource sharing. The creation, if not yet the funding, of the loss and damage fund is such a step. Others that have been called for include additional rounds of Special Drawing Rights emissions and more financial support towards achieving the Sustainable Development Goals.
While these steps would be helpful in terms of global stability, the West also has an interest in backing the Global South to boost support for democracy. China has leveraged its growing role as the main trading partner and an important source of finance for many developing countries to promote its authoritarian political system. Thus, the West should make a serious effort to support the Global South to safeguard its political and economic interests.
Barbara Stallings is Senior Fellow at the Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs, Brown University (USA) and Distinguished Visiting Professor at the Schwarzman Scholars Program, Tsinghua University (PRC).