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Australian help in Pakistan cannot be military

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In Brief

As Australia winds down in Afghanistan after a 12-year war, the new defence minister, David Johnson, has reportedly stated that Australia needs to keep its counter-insurgency skills honed, including for possible use in Pakistan.

It is not clear whether Mr Johnson means a limited role in advising Pakistan on counter-insurgency or envisions a more robust involvement in maintaining stability.

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Either way, there is no useful counter-insurgency role for Australia in Pakistan, either on its own or in concert with its friends and allies.

Pakistan is both a supporter of the insurgency in Afghanistan and involved in counter-insurgency against groups like the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) within Pakistan.

In Afghanistan, the Pakistani military and its intelligence service, the ISI, support Afghan anti-government groups like the Haqqani network and harbour the Taliban leadership in Quetta. US intelligence believes the Haqqani network, with support from the ISI, was involved in the bombing of the Indian embassy in Kabul in 2008, in which 58 died. The network also allegedly killed the Karzai government’s chief peace envoy, Burhanuddin Rabbani.

Pakistan hosts and supports groups like Lashka-e-Toiba (LeT) and Jaish-e-Mohammed, which target India in Kashmir and more broadly in cities like Mumbai, Hyderabad and New Delhi. The LeT was the perpetrator of the Mumbai attacks of 26 November 2008, in which 164 died. Pakistan has so far refused to hand over the 12 people named by India for involvement in these attacks. Seven have been arrested but not brought to trial. The prosecutor in those cases was recently assassinated. There is evidence of involvement of recently retired ISI officers in assisting with the planning of the attacks.

The Pakistani military is also involved in an intensive counter-insurgency campaign in Pakistan itself. The main enemy in this campaign is the TTP. The TTP and other Pakistani Taliban elements were attacked in South Waziristan from 2007 onward — an action in which reportedly over 1000 Pakistani military and paramilitary have died. However, attacking TTP and other militant strongholds in North Waziristan is a ‘bridge too far’ for the Pakistani military, which has also been restrained because it is the location of its client, the Haqqani network. The action in South Waziristan was followed by an equally intensive and bloody campaign to clean out the Pakistani Taliban from the once-peaceful Swat Valley in 2009. The Pakistani military is also engaged in a sporadic and at times bloody separatist movement in Baluchistan, which has continued since the 1970s. Karachi, a city of about 23 million, is at war with itself. Thousands have died on its streets in recent years.

Meanwhile, Pakistan is estimated to have a larger nuclear arsenal than India. This arsenal is perhaps the most rapidly escalating in the world today. Pakistan was given the design of the 1998 uranium bomb by China, which in turn received it from the former Soviet Union. China also provided key ballistic missile technology to Pakistan in the form of the M11 missile. China is Pakistan’s all-weather friend. Beijing indirectly threatened India to prevent it attacking Pakistan in the aftermath of the Mumbai attacks of 2008.

In all of this, Australian counter-insurgency advice would be like ‘teaching one’s grandmother to suck eggs’. Australia has sadly lost 40 soldiers in Afghanistan. Each one of them is sorely missed. Pakistan has lost thousands of military and paramilitary in counter-insurgency operations. Its three-quarters-of-a-million-strong army is highly professional and highly tested in counter-insurgency. It is also operating on its own terrain.

An Australian counter-insurgency role in stabilising Pakistan seems equally unrealistic. This is a country of over 185 million, expected to grow by a further 85 million in the next 20 years. Its problems are deep-seated and require action in many different spheres as well as the military, including governance, economic reform, land reform and education.

A well-targeted aid program would be more suitable. This could be directed at addressing the country’s rapidly escalating environmental problems, assisting with education and literacy, and providing technical assistance in energy and mining. For a country like Australia, it would be better to forget about any military involvement in this complex, difficult part of the world.

Dr Sandy Gordon is a Visiting Fellow at the ANU College of Asia and the Pacific, Australian National University. He is the author of a number of books on South Asia and the Indian Ocean.

6 responses to “Australian help in Pakistan cannot be military”

  1. We should hope that Senator Johnston’s irresponsible comments in his interview with the Sydney Morning Herald, which might have been his first after assuming the Defence portfolio, merely reflect his inexperience and will not be repeated. We should also hope that terrorist groups in Pakistan don’t read this newspaper’s website and won’t target Australians in Pakistan in response.

  2. This is good step in the right direction, counter-insurgency needs to be part of a greater multi-pronged effort to include aid and such. Foreign anti-insurgency can backfire for the same reason that police are strongly resented in the US.

    People will resent the idea of what is essentially a foreign entity entering their space and attacking people who may or may not be their own kinsmen and then policing them. If the effort to oust extremism isn’t a grassroots focused effort it will be resented as an alien intervention.

  3. I agree with Dr Gordon with regard to his criticism of Mr Johnston’s comments about Pakistan. It would be naive on part of Australia to contemplate any military intervention in Pakistan. However, one would have expected more in-depth analysis of the situation in Pakistan from a South Asian scholar of such repute as Mr Gordon. He seems to have fallen for the usual cliches and stereotypes about Pakistan and seems to have accepted most of the Indian allegations against Pakistan on the face value. For instance, his comment that Pakistan has refused to hand over the 12 people allegedly involved in the Mumbai incident is in complete disregard to the fact that there is no legal treaty regime between India and Pakistan for extradition of people wanted for criminal activities in each other’s country. The dossier handed over by India did not have evidence that would stand in a court of law. While conceding that Pakistani legal processes are notoriously slow, Pakistani request to allow the defence and prosecution lawyers to cross examine witnesses has just been granted last week after years of wrangling. Similarly, the cliched comment on Pakistan’s supposedly fastest growing nuclear arsenal is more of a perception than reality. If Australia intends to contribute towards stability in Pakistan it can share its expertise in energy and mining rather than attempting to box far above its weight.

    • Naeem, Thanks for your comments. My understanding is that under international law absence of a bilateral extradition treaty is certainly not a bar to extradition. Multilateral conventions, such as those of the UNODC or SAARC, can be used in the absence of a bilateral convention. In some instances extraditions are made with no convention at all. However, that said, I’m no international lawyer.

      On the nuclear issue, perhaps it could have been better spelt out but was not due to lack of space. My point about Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal was made in ‘short hand’. It was intended to be that the arsenal is relatively large, sophisticated and complex. One of the arguments brought to bear for intervention in Pakistan is to seize so-called ‘loose nukes’ should Pakistan descend into chaos. In my view, this would be extremely difficult if not impossible, given the disbursed and sophisticated nature of the arsenal. Sandy Gordon

      • Thanks Dr Gordon for your reply. the issue of ‘loose nukes’ is exactly the kind of perception I was trying to draw your attention to. It has become fashionable to talk about Pakistani nukes falling into wrong hands without checking the facts on ground. There is no denying the fact that the internal security situation in Pakistan is far from satisfactory, nonetheless nuclear security is being given the attention it deserves. In this regard, two points are important to consider: first, a situation where some rogue element can gain control over all or part of Pakistani assets would be in a highly improbable situation where Pakistan army will cease to exist as a cohesive force. Secondly, the resources and effort Pakistan has invested in enhancing its nuclear security is unprecedented. There is a specially trained security force of 22,000 men dedicated for this purpose, besides a rapid reaction force and round the clock functional operational centre. Pakistan has also set up a purpose built training academy for the security force which is further augmented by counter intelligence teams a functioning personnel reliability programme. You may wish to read the article I jointly wrote with Kenneth Luongo in March 2013 issue of the Arms Control Today. Hope we can continue this interesting exchange of views.

        • Naeem

          Fair enough. But you will note I simply said “one of the arguments brought to bear …” I don’t subscribe to those views but they are certainly out there, including in the academic literature. Sandy

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