The world watched closely as Taiwan’s new president, Lai Ching-te, delivered his inauguration speech on 20 May 2024. While some experts noted Lai’s relatively conciliatory tone, suggesting an olive branch towards Beijing and his commitment to maintaining peace in the Taiwan Strait, it would be wise to remain cautious.
Beneath the surface, much of Lai’s speech conveyed more hostile messages towards Beijing compared to former president Tsai Ing-wen. The most provocative element was his consistent reference to China simply as ‘China’. In contrast, Tsai typically referred to China as ‘the authorities in Beijing’ or ‘the authorities of mainland China’, adhering to the diplomatic terminology used by previous Taiwanese presidents. Lai was the first president of Taiwan to exclusively use ‘China’ in formal speeches.
By avoiding the direct reference to ‘China’, this approach aligns with the Republic of China (ROC) constitutional principle that the Beijing government is not a separate state but a local authority of the ROC. Though Beijing disfavours this stance, it is paradoxically preferred over a two-state scenario, as it still upholds the one-China principle.
The situation worsened with Lai’s proclamation that ‘the Republic of China and the People’s Republic of China are not subordinate to each other’. This statement, initially introduced by President Tsai in 2021 as the second of her ‘four commitments’, was never reiterated by her in formal addresses after that year. Lai’s high-profile reiteration of this in his first inaugural address, criticised by Beijing as a ‘confession of Taiwan independence’, asserts that mainland China and Taiwan are two separate and equal states. It directly contradicts the ‘1992 consensus’, a key political baseline agreed upon by the Chinese Communist Party and the Kuomintang (KMT) in 1992, asserting that mainland China and Taiwan are part of one China.
Former governments have traditionally claimed that ‘both sides of the Taiwan Strait are not subordinate to each other’, honouring the ROC constitutional spirit by avoiding the use of official names. While Lai’s updated proclamation carries the same meaning, it diverges significantly in political implications.
Lai also made history by calling on China to ‘face the reality of the ROC’s existence’. While the traditional wording was already intolerable to Beijing, which has refused to acknowledge the ROC’s existence since 1949, Lai’s version is more provocative, calling for a separation between the People’s Republic of China and the ROC.
Inauguration speeches by Taiwanese presidents are significant as they establish the tone for cross-strait policies over the next four years. Traditionally, these addresses have been conciliatory towards China. Notably, former president Chen Shui-bian, the first Taiwanese president from the pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), proclaimed in his 2000 inaugural address that he would not seek de jure independence. Tsai even stated in her first address in 2016 that she would accept the historical facts of the Mainland–Taiwan dialogues in 1992, a partial recognition of the ‘1992 consensus’.
Lai’s inclusion of numerous ‘two-state theory’ statements in his inaugural address should deeply concern those who care about peace in the Taiwan Strait. If this was Lai’s most conciliatory address, it will likely be followed by tougher rhetoric in the coming years.
Of course, it is not that Lai must appease Beijing to demonstrate commitment to maintaining peace, nor should his commitment to peace be judged by China’s reaction to the speech. Lai pointed out that even if Taiwan were to accept China’s position entirely and relinquish its sovereignty, China’s ambition to annex Taiwan would not disappear. He implies that China has already lost its credibility in upholding the principles of ‘One Country, Two Systems.’ Given the events in Hong Kong since 2019, Lai’s argument is certainly convincing.
Lai’s commitment to maintaining peace should not be judged by the inaugural speeches of his predecessors. Since 2000, China has grown significantly more aggressive towards Taiwan, while Taiwan’s public sentiment has shifted further away from unification towards maintaining autonomy from Beijing’s control. The key point is to recognise Lai’s heightened hostility towards China compared to former president Tsai. This profoundly provocative address should not be misinterpreted as conciliatory.
Lai’s heightened antagonism towards Beijing is further complicated by domestic challenges. With his DPP party plagued by corruption and political scandal, Lai won the presidency with just over 40 per cent of the vote in January 2024. This slim margin has sparked speculation of a turbulent administration. The DPP’s loss of the legislative majority to a coalition between the KMT and the Taiwan People’s Party has already shown its disruptive potential during legislative reform contentions. Given these dynamics, Lai’s intensified hostility towards China leaves his administration vulnerable to attacks from the pro-Beijing KMT.
Most Taiwanese favour maintaining the status quo and peace with China. Yet Lai’s inaugural address introduced the prospect of increased conflict around the Taiwan Strait, exemplified by recent Chinese military drills in response to his speech. By disregarding public opinion and deviating from former president Tsai’s more moderate cross-strait policies, Lai is setting a precarious course.
From the DPP and Lai’s perspective, whether Beijing’s strong negative reaction to his speech was anticipated remains debatable. If it was expected, Lai’s antagonistic tone signals his long-standing pro-independence stance and an effort to solidify his base. Conversely, if Lai believed he extended an olive branch and did not foresee such a reaction, his cross-strait advisors should be held accountable for misguiding him into antagonising Beijing. But this seems less plausible as Lai, with his experience, is unlikely to be so easily misled.
The most concerning scenario is that this might represent the maximum level of conciliation that the DPP and the CCP can muster. While the immediate danger of war may not be pressing, their irresolvable differences could eventually escalate into a full-blown conflict.
David Zhong is a recent Masters’ graduate in Asian Studies from the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University. His research focuses on East Asian politics and US–China relations. He has internship experiences at the Wilson Center and the Quincy Institute.
It’s hard to credit that such a straight-up piece of PRC propaganda was published here, but then I guess it is East Asia Forum.
“Former governments have traditionally claimed that ‘both sides of the Taiwan Strait are not subordinate to each other’, honouring the ROC constitutional spirit by avoiding the use of official names. While Lai’s updated proclamation carries the same meaning, it diverges significantly in political implications.”
False. Anyone with google can easily find that the ROC presidents since the late 1990s, except for pro-China nationalist Ma Ying-jeou, have consistently claimed the opposite, beginning with Lee Teng-hui who said the ROC has “exclusive” sovereignty back in 1997: “The President said that the sovereignty of the Republic of China is both exclusive and complete, just like that of the United States, Britain or France…”, through Tsai Ing-wen who said that PRC and ROC are not subordinate to each other in her 2021 National Day Speech. Since Lai’s speech numerous articles have been published explaining this. The editors certainly should have caught this and sent it back for correction.
“It directly contradicts the ‘1992 consensus’, a key political baseline agreed upon by the Chinese Communist Party and the Kuomintang (KMT) in 1992, asserting that mainland China and Taiwan are part of one China.”
The 1992 Consensus is a fabrication of the late 1990s/early 2000s and is not agreed upon by either government at the 1992 meeting. The writer leaves out the fictional nature of this claim, promoted in the 2000 election by KMT heavyweight Su Chi to box in the DPP’s foreign policy, along with the PRC rejection of the KMT codocil that there are “two interpretations”. The PRC itself does not accept the 1992 Consensus, merely treating it as another way to say Taiwan belongs to the PRC. Neither the public in Taiwan nor the DPP accepts this idea, and it has never been accepted via any democratic process. It’s so awful and so widely disliked that many in the KMT have advocated dumping it. The author’s omission of these facts shows a powerful bias the editors should have caught and insisted on rectifying.
“Most Taiwanese favour maintaining the status quo and peace with China. Yet Lai’s inaugural address introduced the prospect of increased conflict around the Taiwan Strait, exemplified by recent Chinese military drills in response to his speech.”
This argument removes any agency from the PRC. Lai made a speech, the PRC is responsible for raising tensions in response — that is entirely the PRC’s choice. The complicated nature of the “drills” suggests they were planned long in advance and had nothing to do with any word choices of Lai. They are thus not a “response” to Lai’s speech. Rather, they are part of a broad propaganda program, like this piece EAF chose to host, to convince people that Lai is “provocative”.
“The key point is to recognise Lai’s heightened hostility towards China compared to former president Tsai. ”
LOL. Tsai has exactly the same position that Lai does. When Tsai said in 2021 that the two sides are not subordinate to each other the PRC accused her of reviving the idea that relations between Taiwan and the PRC are “special state-to-state relations” theory of Lee Teng-hui — a theory she is often seen as a key author of. Tsai is wittier and quieter than Lai, but as even the most cursory review will show, they are no different. Lai said so during his primary challenge to her in 2020, when questioned on that exact matter.
Tsai’s regular criticisms of the PRC for “escalation of their military intimidation, diplomatic pressure, trade obstructions and attempts to erase the sovereignty of the Republic of China (Taiwan)” — see her 2022 National Day Address — are completely consistent with the view that there are two countries on each side of the Taiwan Strait. Lai simply followed this route.
The shift to a Taiwan-centered discourse is also part of Tsai’s package. As Courtney Donovan Smith pointed out in a perceptive piece at Ketagalen Media after her 2020 inaugural speech, Tsai said “Taiwan” or “Taiwanese” fifty times, but used “Republic of China” only five times. Moreover, he noted, Tsai was shifting the discourse from “Republic of China” to “Republic of China” (Taiwan). Tsai also referred to the “70 years” here on Taiwan, ignoring the pre-Taiwan existence of the ROC.
“Tsai even stated in her first address in 2016 that she would accept the historical facts of the Mainland–Taiwan dialogues in 1992, a partial recognition of the ‘1992 consensus’.”
No, she didn’t. She simply stated the meeting itself was a historical fact. She was in her usual quietly acerbic way actually saying the opposite, that only the meeting was a fact, but no “consensus” between the representatives of the two murderous unelected authoritarian parties was reached.
In short, this piece largely regurgitates PRC propaganda claims that claim that Lai’s milquetoast speech consistent with the views of previous pro-Taiwan presidents was somehow an independence drama, and substantively misrepresents past events.
Michael Turton
Taipei Times
If you believe this piece is PRC propaganda, that means you don’t understand the subtlety of political language used in the cross-strait context, the very gist this article tries to deliver. Of course, you are right to point out that except for President Ma, every other president since President Lee has made similar claims as Lai did in the address, that PRC and ROC are not subordinate to each other, however, the argument of this piece is that no president has said so in his or her inauguration speeches, let alone the first one of them. To make a statement along the “two-state theory” is common, yes, but it is odd to make this statement in an inauguration speech.
These speeches carry the highest level of political subtlety in language choices. The first inauguration speeches were a chance for the ROC presidents from DPP to showcase conciliatory attitudes and friendly messages to Beijing, but Lai took a different path. This is, unfortunately, a truth. This truth does not need to be confirmed by Beijing’s overreaction to it, as Beijing always does, but it is simply true and it is important to point out, as mainstream narratives either did not pick it up or pretend to ignore it.
As for the point that the claim that “PRC and ROC are not subordinate to each other” was first raised by President Tsai in 2021, the article should make it clear and thanks for the suggestion. However, if you care to check, President Tsai only said the exact words once, in the National Day address in 2021, and later referenced it only by mentioning “four commitments.” Tsai knew that the words went too far and would be perceived as overly provocative so she stopped repeating them. There is a huge difference between Tsai’s measure and Lai’s choice of using the exact phrase in his first inauguration address.
All the rebuttals regarding the 92 Consensus, to me, are just reflections of ideological differences. Anyone who studies cross-strait relations knows that 92 Consensus is among the most controversial, murky, and unclear concepts in the field, and it is definitely up to different interpretations. However, no one could deny that under this consensus that you believe is “fictional,” China and Taiwan were able to develop a robust trading relationship and vibrant people-to-people exchanges from 2008 to the mid-Tsai period. Mayor Hou, in his last presidential campaign, also officially acknowledged that the KMT accepts the 92 Consensus that’s compatible with the ROC constitution. The future of the 92 Consensus is up for debate of course, but calling it fictional is deliberate being ignorant of the past success that both sides achieved under the 92 Consensus.
Readers of EAF deeply appreciate its analysis which is open to all sides on Taiwan’s domestic politics and its willingness to publish reasoned argument from different perspectives.