Myanmar’s military junta announced in February 2024 that it is enforcing mandatory conscription for men aged 18–35 and women aged 18–27. Those evading conscription now face penalties in the form of heavy fines or imprisonment for three to five years. Starting in April 2024, the conscription scheme aims to enlist 60,000 people within a year, dragging huge numbers of unwilling youth into the line of fire.
With millions impacted by another devastating policy under military rule, the international community cannot gamble on the junta’s willingness to act constructively any longer. Moving forward, international actors must ramp up support for local pro-democracy stakeholders.
The military is facing a crisis in manpower. Historically, it relied on voluntary recruitment of poverty-stricken communities and underaged males. This tactic was temporarily offset by an increase in economic opportunities during the military’s power-sharing period with the National League for Democracy civilian government. Enlistment rates have remained low since and stagnated further in the post-coup climate. In addition to horrific living conditions for conscripts, the vast majority of civilians lack the incentive for voluntary enlistment given the military’s atrocities and losses on the battlefield.
The junta is also struggling to maintain control in many parts of the country as resistance forces launch coordinated campaigns and establish independent governing structures. Mandatory conscription will serve as a counterweight for military defections, which some estimates place around 14,000 since the coup, on top of increasing death tolls. Many consider forced conscription as a desperate act by the military, but it creates graver concerns.
Conscription will worsen Myanmar’s human rights crisis. In addition to low rates of voluntary enlistment and a lack of popular support, the junta’s functioning capacity is stretched thin. This makes systematic implementation of the law infeasible. Military officials will need to rely on entrapment, arbitrary abductions and other repressive methods to enforce mandatory conscription.
Thousands have rushed to foreign embassies and passport offices to obtain documents for emigration. This led to a stampede in Mandalay in February 2024 that left two women dead. Many of those who are unable to acquire such documentation will nonetheless flee the country to protect themselves and their families. The UN High Commission for Refugees reports that there are around 1.35 million refugees and 2 million internally displaced persons in Myanmar. Both numbers are set to increase sharply as people flee towards ‘liberated zones’ inside Myanmar or towards neighbouring countries to avoid being drafted.
As millions find ways to evade conscription, they are vulnerable to extortion by military authorities. Myanmar continues to rank among the world’s most corrupt states. It is likely that civilians will have to pay off military officers to avoid conscription. This is an extreme toll on a populace facing high inflation and deteriorating socio-economic conditions. While wealthy families can afford to pay bribes, middle and working-class communities will be hit hardest by forced conscription.
The most troubling implication is that the military seeks to make an entire country victim and accomplice to human rights abuses. The military’s scorched earth campaigns have resulted in mass atrocities against whole communities. At least 60,000 households have been destroyed between 2021 and 2023 due to such campaigns. The military’s use of human shields during crackdowns is also well-documented. Abducting and employing civilians as cannon fodder is very common.
In view of these practices, mandatory conscription must be treated as a human rights catastrophe. The military is pitting civilian against civilian and forcing youth to either do harm or be harmed. The conscription law serves as a justification for coercing and persecuting civilians, and spreading abuses on a larger scale.
The junta’s move highlights the ineffectiveness of current international pressure. Existing sanctions have done little to deter the military from carrying out nationwide persecution and escalating the humanitarian crisis. Its leaders have also proven their disregard for multilateral agreements, including the ASEAN Five-Point Consensus.
ASEAN announced its intention to develop a ‘Myanmar-owned and led’ solution in January 2024. It also backs Thailand’s plan to build a humanitarian corridor on the Thailand–Myanmar border with the help of the Myanmar Red Cross Society, a junta-backed body. But just days after the ASEAN meeting, the junta enforced mandatory conscription to safeguard its own interests. Hence, any real solution to the conflict and human rights crisis under military governance remains wishful thinking.
Local pro-democracy actors remain in the best position to reach civilians directly. International bodies must maintain active and open engagement with the resistance-led National Unity Government and other members of the National Unity Consultative Council. Sagaing, Karenni (Kayah), Karen and Tanintharyi areas, which are growing hubs for pro-democracy resistance groups, will be likely destinations for youths escaping conscription. Hence, international bodies need to establish support mechanisms for democratic deliberations on the ground, such as the Karenni State’s Interim Council and Sagaing Forum.
Foreign governments cannot rely on aid strategies that stop at Myanmar’s borders and sporadic consultation with domestic stakeholders. Foreign governments should leverage diaspora networks in their own countries as a gateway to stronger coordination with domestic organisations.
Conscription affects communities far from border areas where most foreign aid networks are based. As Myanmar’s pro-democratic faction strives to build inclusivity, accountability, aid channels and stable administrative systems at the grassroots level, international actors must depend on them to reach populations in need. Prolonged hesitation to support local efforts will continue to put millions in Myanmar at risk.
Calvin San is a student in the Department of Political Science at the University of British Columbia. He is an Institute of Asian Research Fellow, working with the Centre for Southeast Asia Research and the UBC Myanmar Initiative.