Either the military, and in particular the Inter Services Intelligence agency (ISI), knew of his presence, in which case the government of Pakistan was complicit in hiding him. Or the government and the ISI did not know, in which case they were incompetent. Second, the question that appears to trouble Pakistani officials and the public more is how the US operation itself could have gone completely undetected. After all, one of the helicopters crashed, there was a firefight in the compound, and multiple fires broke out, and yet not a single policeman apparently came to check. Once again, from the Pakistani perspective, either the military and the ISI were complicit, only this time with the US, or incompetent and incapable of protecting the sovereignty of the country.
The question of who in Pakistan knew of Bin Laden’s presence in the country and what they knew will undoubtedly be investigated at length by the Pakistanis and the US. It is highly probable, as President Obama said on 8 May, that Bin Laden had some type of support network inside Pakistan, although it is not known whether he had the support of the government or the military. Presumably in time the answer to this question will emerge, and hopefully it will be made public as well.
On the other question, it strains credulity that ‘Operation Neptune Spear’ could have taken place without any Pakistani assistance. After all, US helicopters flew from their base in Jalalabad in Afghanistan to Abbottabad, some 250 kilometres away inside Pakistan, flying over some of the most militarised areas in the country. The Pakistanis claim that the Bin Laden compound had been investigated previously by the ISI and that they had shared information about it with the US since 2009. US officials dispute that contention, claiming they did not know of the Bin Laden compound until last August. Finally, the CIA rented a house near the Bin Laden compound for surveillance, and it is logical to conclude that at least some Pakistani authorities had known that this had been done and why.
If there was cooperation, the story that US forces carried out the weekend operation themselves without the knowledge of the Pakistani government could well reflect the Pakistan government’s own request. In a country that has seen increasing radicalisation since the late 1970s, and where this radicalisation has led to increasing militancy since 9/11 — due to operations against militant/extremist organisations — the authorities would be averse to publicly stating that they played any role in such an operation. Indeed, some believe that this very strategy is also pursued when it comes to US drone attacks inside Pakistan; the government publicly condemns such attacks as a violation of sovereignty as it looks the other way, according to this view. Indeed, there is suspicion that some drones may actually fly from bases within the country. Perhaps confirming the view that the Pakistan government may have known about the operation, the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the organisation responsible for the most daring assassinations, suicide attacks and militant operations within Pakistan, has stated that its revenge attacks will focus on the Pakistan government, including a targeting of political leaders.
Even if the Pakistan government were involved in hiding Bin Laden, the reason why the US will likely continue its support in recognition of the reality, is that as bad as elements within the Pakistani administration may be, and as much as some of them may be playing a double game, the alternatives are worse. Allegations of double play by Pakistan are hardly new. In this case, the current government in Pakistan is the result of democratic elections, perhaps the freest in decades, in 2008. The government of the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) is largely secular and nationally representative. Its ouster would only risk bringing relatively more conservative forces-— who have taken a much harsher stance against US interference in Pakistan — into office, implying that bilateral relations could worsen from their already delicate position. As things stand, at least this Pakistani government remains committed to fighting militancy, despite having suffered more than 30,000 civilian and military casualties.
So far, the political fallout in Pakistan has been manageable. While there has been a call for the resignations of President Asif Ali Zardari and Prime Minister Yusuf Raza Gilani by the former foreign minister and senior PPP member Shah Mahmood Qureshi, generally public opposition has been muted. The demonstrations of extremist Islamic parties decrying the killing of Bin Laden have been small and very easily contained by the police.
What about the economic consequences? Certainly, the threats by extremist groups seeking to avenge Bin Laden’s killing will create greater insecurity in the country. In an economy in virtual recession with growth this year projected to be only 2-3 per cent, the higher uncertainty will translate into even slower economic activity. Add to this increased security expenditures to fight the terrorist groups, which will mean that either the fiscal deficit will increase from the projected 6 per cent of GDP for this year, or government social or development expenditures will have to be cut. Neither of these options is an appealing choice.
The cutting off of US aid, which some politicians and opinion-makers in the US are calling for, would have serious economic consequences for Pakistan. The macroeconomic implications for Pakistan from the possibility of reduced US assistance are significant. Total hard currency inflows from the US into Pakistan (loans, grants, exports, remittances and so on) amount to about $8 billion annually, which represents about 16 per cent of total inflows of around $50 billion. And while this amount seems small in relation to inflows from other countries, the US continues to have considerable influence over inflows from other countries as well, implying that the impact of a deterioration in bilateral relations could be wider than just the US-specific inflows. Considering that gross external financing requirements are around $12 billion annually over the next few years, the consequences of lost multilateral and bilateral financing would be much beyond just the external sector. This should provide a compelling reason for the Pakistani government, including the military, which receives about $1.5 billion a year in US direct support, to stay engaged with the US.
Despite the possible immediate political and economic fallout, the killing of Osama Bin Laden could well lead to a positive outcome for Pakistan. With the army and the ISI on the defensive, the embarrassment of this episode could in fact strengthen the civilian governments’ hands in overseeing the security services. It is highly unusual in a democratic society to have the main intelligence service report to the military and not to the elected government. Furthermore, in trying to regain its reputation internationally as well as domestically, the military may take the fight to the extremist groups operating inside Pakistan and in the border areas between Pakistan and Afghanistan. If so, the killing Bin Laden could have a real net benefit for Pakistan. Hopefully, the Pakistan government and the military will be able to reap this benefit.
Raza Agha is Vice President, Royal Bank of Scotland, UK, and Mohsin Khan is Senior Fellow at Peterson Institute for International Economics. The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not reflect the views and opinions of the institutions with which they are affiliated.
There has been feverish speculation in Pakistan about the complicity of ISI in the Abbottabad attack. The recent history of hysterical local protests over each successive US drone attack and also in the wake of the Raymond Davis shooting incident in Lahore may conceivably have led ISI to adopt a strategy of denial over the Abbottabad incident as the authors suggest. However the premise requires a fairly large web of conspiracy involving not only the ISI and the military establishment but also the Pakistani Government. The authors’ comment that the Tehreek-e-Taliban revenge attacks may confirm ISI complicity are purely speculative as these groups could also be swallowing the same conspiracy theories that abound in Pakistan.
As the old dictum states, these facts can also be built on a far simpler proposition – that the CIA may have employed trusted contacts cultivated within the ISI to effect some aspects of the operation that may have dulled ISI’s intelligence during the raid. The fact that CIA safe houses operated within distance of OBL’s mansion and that many senior ranking US officers had visited the Abbottabad military complex suggests a history of engagement over several years that could easily offer many opportunities for intelligence cultivation of ISI sources. Furthermore, Raymond Davis’s mobile was claimed to contain pictures of Pak military installations along the Kashmir border and elsewhere suggesting that either foreigners could visit such areas with impunity or may have done so with the aid of local contacts.
A full-scale ISI-CIA conspiracy theory cannot explain the fury with which the Pakistani Government and the ISI have reacted to the OBL killing. It is more likely that the ISI may have been intentionally misled by the US sources as to the true nature of the eventual military operation but are now caught in a vice whereby they cannot reveal the duplicity for fear of exposing the nature of past intelligence cooperation. This could also explain the relatively harsh commentary post-OBL by Obama and his administration. A full-scale conspiracy would have resulted in relatively muted criticism.
Whatever the outcome of the post-OBL anger in the US Congress and elsewhere, the fact remains that Pakistan cannot be left to rot as a fragile state with access to nuclear weaponry. As Gilani himself stated, China is an “all-weather friend” of Pakistan – a move designed to raise the China spectre for those peddling hawkish sentiments at the US Congress. Whilst China itself would move slowly to fill any vacuum created by these repercussions, there is no doubting the fact that US is in Pakistan for the long haul as this nation is indeed far too big to fail.
What the huge US can and should do is demand far greater accountability for the massive aid pouring to the Pakistani military which has apparently been diverted into building up its nuclear arsenal. Such a situation is indeed fraught with risk and the post-OBL climate of introspection and review in US-Pakistan relations should be used to drive greater accountability and transparency in the Pakistani military’s expenditure of US aid dollars. This is a far better and immediate imperative than simply hoping for a change in the position of ISI – a rogue intelligence organisation has long enjoyed complete freedom to pursue its own agenda within and outside of Pakistan and answerable to no one in particular. Too much to hope for that to change any time soon.
“With the army and the ISI on the defensive, the embarrassment of this episode could in fact strengthen the civilian governments’ hands in overseeing the security services.”
But unfortunately, the recent statements of PM Gilani and the proceedings of the extraordinary session of the Pakistani Parliament suggest that the civilian government is working overtime as the PR agent to the army and ISI.
I would like to add two points to what I have already said.
1. The Army and ISI have faced similar pressures at least on two other occasions: Bangladesh’s War of Independence, which lead to the partition of Pakistan, and Kargil War, in which Pakistan was forced to withdraw after the Clinton Administration refused to support Pakistan. On both occasions, the civilian leaders failed to alter their skewed relationship with the Army/ISI.
2. One could still argue that things could work out differently this time. That the window of opportunity has already been closed should be clear from the ISI head’s statement in the Parliament that he has already conducted rehearsals of launching clandestine attacks on selected locations in neighbouring countries.