At the risk of sounding paradoxical, North Korea is behaving much more strategically than South Korea. The North Korean Foreign Ministry announced, on April 29, in connection with its rocket launch and the subsequent move of the international community toward sanctions vis-à-vis North Korea that ‘if the UN Security Council did not apologize, [DPRK] would resort to a nuclear test and an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) test as a self-defence measure.’

Experts have tended to interpret this North Korean response as a push for direct negotiations with the United States. The fact that North Korea seems pressed for time due to its own internal problems is also considered a factor in the response. Is there a greater meaning behind it, though?

North Korea’s long-term strategic goal is to make its nuclear and long-range missile capabilities a fait accompli and to be recognized as such by using whatever means possible.

From a mid-term perspective, one could assume that North Korea has goals in three different areas: internal politics, foreign policy, and regarding its weapons systems.

For domestic political purposes, North Korea wants to show off its nuclear and missile capabilities to emphasize that the Kim Jong-il regime is strong.

At the foreign policy level, North Korea wants to grab the attention of the U.S. and to possess the upper hand in negotiations.

At the weapons system level, North Korea, through the latest missile launch, is trying to make up for tests in the past that failed or were incomplete, and to bring its weapons of mass destruction and delivery vehicles to technical completion.

In short, the North Korean plan is to create a ‘powerful nation (kangseong daeguk) through the execution of its military-first policy (seongun jeongchi).

Until now, North Korea has consistently pursued a strategy of becoming a nuclear weapon and missile-armed country, despite having to make great sacrifices on the way. North Korea has resorted to brinksmanship, tried to lure negotiating partners to the bargaining table in the name of striking a ‘grand bargain,’ and has used ‘salami tactics,’ the slicing of bargaining trade-offs into thinner slices to gain more concessions.

North Korea has gained enough confidence to ask the UN Security Council to apologize for the sanctions measures that have been applied against it.

It is difficult for democratic countries like South Korea and the United States, where governments change as a matter of course, to pursue consistent strategies and policies with the same objectives in mind. What is certain is that these countries have to think and respond strategically to North Korea’s behaviour. One cannot simply write off North Korea’s behaviour as reckless and then wait for the consequences of those actions to catch up with it.

Since 2002, South Korea and the U.S. have limited their responses to statements that merely condemn North Korean actions, such as the resumption of nuclear activities (2003), declaration of nuclear weapons possession (2005), and the testing of nuclear weapons (2006).

From a North Korean perspective, it might be possible to conclude that the U.S. and South Korea have no red line with regard to weapons development, and no timeline with regard to negotiations.

North Korea made South Korea’s decision to participate in PSI a more serious issue. However, even if South Korea had declared its intention to fully participate in PSI, this still would not have been a strategic response to North Korea’s rocket launch.

North Korea has caused a great disturbance in the world order with the development of its nuclear weapons and missiles, despite continuous objections from the five UN Security Council members and the members of the Six-Party Talks. The South Korean government and the new U.S. administration should conduct in-depth discussions to decide what kind of stance they will take and how they will respond to North Korea.

In dealing with North Korea’s nuclear and missile issues, a review of the transfer of wartime operational control, as part of the strengthening the ROK-U.S. alliance, should be an important part of the response. Now that we are at a crucial transition point, where the major powers surrounding the Korean Peninsula are actively engaged in creating a new strategic board game, it is necessary to come up with a complete strategic response, one that takes into consideration the big picture, and the future of the Korean Peninsula.

Han Sung-Joo is Professor Emeritus, Korea University and a former minister of foreign affairs. A version of this article originally appeared in the Dong-A Ilbo, May 5, 2009.