One of the key questions about China’s relations with Myanmar is whether Beijing is supporting the State Administration Council (SAC) military junta. To the naive eye, it seems natural that the Chinese Communist Party would support the SAC because of their shared authoritarian nature. 

But understanding China’s role in the complex domestic politics of the ongoing crisis in Myanmar only in terms of those supposed ideological affinities occludes the reality that China has been playing a hedging game with a variety of political forces within Myanmar for at least a decade — including those now opposed to SAC rule. 

This approach arises out of lessons learned from China’s over-dependence on the Myanmar military in the past — before the latter turned against Beijing’s interests in 2010–2011. Thein Sein’s military-aligned government unilaterally warmed up relations with Washington and other Western countries at the cost of long-term Chinese interests in Myanmar,  with several Chinese investment projects coming under threat, including the suspension of the Myitsone dam. 

In Beijing’s eyes, the Myanmar military was no longer trustworthy. From that moment onwards, Beijing gradually reached out to Aung San Suu Kyi and the National League for Democracy to cultivate a close relationship, which became a very cooperative one when she and her party came into power after the 2015 national elections.

Ultimately Beijing’s strategy is to maximise its interests in Myanmar, where the tussle for power has intensified and the future is extremely uncertain. With the SAC, opposing National Unity Government (NUG), the People’s Defence Forces as well as the myriad of ethnic armed organisations (EAOs) all vying for power, Beijing must hedge its bets and work with whoever serves its interests best.

When scholars discuss hedging as a foreign policy practice, it is often described as the best choice in uncertain geopolitical contexts. Much has been said about how countries in Southeast Asia have practiced hedging amid US–China competition as an ‘active insurance-seeking behaviour aimed at mitigating risks and cultivating fall-back options under uncertainty’. 

Though few have applied this logic to relations between foreign governments and domestic actors, the hedging logic is applicable in the Myanmar context, where there are competing regimes and a plethora of armed resistance groups with their own agency and special interests. In this uncertain environment, Beijing, which has a huge economic and strategic stake in Myanmar, will naturally want to engage with as many actors as possible. 

This has encompassed groups at the forefront of the opposition to the SAC junta. Since late October 2023, the Three Brotherhood Alliance — comprising the Arakan Army (AA), Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), and the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) —  has waged a well-coordinated military offense against junta strongholds in the northern Shan State. This alliance of EAOs has since made significant advances against the SAC and its affiliated Border Guard Forces. 

Since the launch of Operation 1027, the alliance has captured at least 12 towns and overrun more than 400 junta bases and outposts in Rakhine, Chin and northern Shan States. Along the Myanmar–China frontier, the alliance has effectively taken over several prominent crossings through which a substantial amount of cross-border trade takes place. 

The MNDAA’s primary goal is to retake the Kokang region, previously the Special Region One of the Shan State, from which it was driven out by the Myanmar military in a major military offensive in 2009. Yet in its official statement, it says the goal of its operations is to help China crack down on online scam syndicates based in Kokang, where the SAC-approved leader Bai Suocheng was labelled the main culprit. 

On 11 December 2023, China’s Ministry of Public Security issued an arrest warrant for Bai. Since he is backed by the Myanmar military, Beijing has been dissatisfied by the lack of action by the SAC. Instead, Beijing decided to rely on the MNDAA to achieve its goal. 

The Chinese government has also tried to broker a ceasefire agreement between the SAC and the Three Brotherhood Alliance in Kunming. As MNDAA ultimately captured Laukkai, it is believed that Beijing is, for now, satisfied with the success of the EAOs and would like to see political stability to return to the borderland region.

China still continues to work with the junta in other parts of the country where the latter’s blessing is necessary. This was illustrated in December 2023, when Chinese state-owned firm CITIC signed an addendum to accelerate the development of the Kyaukphyu Special Economic Zone in the Rakhine state, where China has invested heavily to link its Southwestern provinces to the Indian Ocean via Myanmar. SAC Chief Min Aung Hlaing also participated in the China sponsored Lancang–Mekong Cooperation leaders meeting. 

Beijing is an all-around hedger amid Myanmar’s domestic political chaos. If the NUG or other stakeholders can demonstrate their utility to Beijing, it will probably be interested in working with them for a mutually beneficial solution.

The NUG recently issued a list of its policies on China, where it stated it would support the One China Policy, protect China’s existing economic interests and honour all the agreements it has already made in Myanmar. As such, it seems the NUG has already started courting Beijing’s support.

Enze Han is Associate Professor at the Department of Politics and Public Administration, University of Hong Kong.