The North Korea–US summit will be a spectacular drama, but in diplomatic and strategic terms it will be a mess. US intelligence and diplomatic professionals will be battling the White House to determine the Trump administration’s diplomatic approach. New US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and National Security Advisor John Bolton echo President Donald Trump in their extremism, contempt for the international system, and disregard for diplomacy. Will the involvement of the United States, with its conflicted interests, support or inhibit the progress that is now likely?
The US about-face after 17 years of coercion and fear of talking to North Korea should be given close attention. The Trump administration is racing to reassemble a team with enough diplomatic expertise to negotiate with North Korea and to re-establish its capacity to plan strategically. Should these two efforts fall short, the chances of a successful DPRK–US summit will fade.
The North–South summit on 27 April will begin to re-establish economic and political links on the Peninsula that may facilitate short- and medium-term planning for joint development. Longer-term plans depend on sanctions relief from the UN, an issue that South Korean President Moon Jae-in will have to handle smartly. This may partly explain why he has dragged Trump into talks at a time when the United States is unprepared.
This is the major gamble of the North Korea–US summit. The DPRK has little reason to reach an agreement with the United States unless sanctions begin to be eased. Yet any easing of sanctions makes it harder for the White House to claim that the DPRK is surrendering under US pressure. Trump’s latest gambit, withholding the US–Korea trade agreement presumably to force South Korean President Moon Jae-in to adopt his surrender demand, will test the use of sanctions. The gamble appears to make sense from Moon’s point of view, since the most likely downside of the summit is prolonged diplomatic wrangling, not military action.
Stability and security on the Korean Peninsula is very much a regional project. At the height of inter-Korean rapprochement in 2000, North Korea’s neighbours anticipated significant benefits to easing tensions, from increased infrastructure spending to savings in military expenditure. This time, the planning for North Korean economic development funded by the World Bank, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank or the Belt and Road Initiative cannot be held hostage to the whims of an unpredictable US administration. These economic opportunities have been put off for too long and they are too politically valuable for regional leaders and their governments to postpone them.
South Korea would therefore be wise to make sure that US actions are parallel but separate from any medium- and long-term inter-Korean or regional initiatives. This would keep open the possibility of a future US president more seriously joining these regional projects.
The South Koreans are apparently leading both summit processes. It will be more important than ever for them to fully bring the UN into multiple supporting roles, ranging from nuclear inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency to humanitarian involvement by the Red Cross and the convening role of UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres. In light of the Trump administration’s reduced diplomatic capacity and its continuing disinterest in multilateral and international institutions, UN participation will be critical to address the deficit of regional leadership.
Why is this diplomatic break from over 15 years of stalemate happening now? And why has the sudden activism on the part of South and North Korea been well received by the United States?
There are three primary reasons. First, Washington is weaker and less capable of strategic diplomacy than it has been in a generation, but its position is more flexible than ever. Second, Seoul is led once again by a progressive president, and Moon has more political legitimacy than any of his predecessors. Third, North Korea has increased confidence in its military deterrent and political stability. Kim Jong-un faces the best external environment in 17 years despite North Korea feeling the squeeze of sanctions. From his perspective, now may be a good time to try to reassemble elements from 2000 and to move forward with economic development.
But North Korea is still isolated and poor. When diplomacy has worked in the past, it was because South Korea, the United States and the international community made credible promises to make economic development available. The DPRK–China meeting suggests that China will oppose US military threats more strongly and support the easing of sanctions more quickly. It may also mean that the DPRK will feel additional confidence, and begin to deal away its nuclear weapons capability.
In the short term, the summits may enable the United States to recover the three Americans held hostage in North Korea, arrange a freeze in Kim’s nuclear program, and cut off a range of humanitarian and illicit activities. In the longer term, the region is beginning an evolution towards greater political engagement, less security risk, and infrastructure development. It is now up to South Korea to choreograph this two-step dance, keeping the United States happy but not in the way, in a very short matter of months.
Stephen Costello is an independent analyst and consultant and the producer of AsiaEast. He was formerly director of the Korea Program at the Atlantic Council and director of the Kim Dae Jung Peace Foundation. His column appears in The Korea Times. You can follow him on Twitter at @CostelloScost.
Short of China putting a large number of troops along with some nuclear weapons capacity close to its border with the DPRK along with security guarantees I doubt that Kim will be willing to give up his nuclear capabilities so readily. I also doubt that Moon, Abe, or anyone else can rely on Trump following any kind of reasonable, let alone predictable, protocol or plan of action.
I hope I am wrong but I think the situation is still more dicey than this analysis suggests.
Richard,
I think you are right that no one can rely on Trump following any plan or agreement. I also agree that there is a degree of dicey-ness in the proposed Trump-Kim meeting. For that reason it is likely that Kim Jung-un will see a deal with Trump as a short-term arrangement, until the next US administration, or the next, becomes fully engaged. Aside from robust deterrence, there is a limit to how much outside powers can influence the DPRK regime if they were to reject a good deal.
But they can’t eat their nuclear or missile programs, despite their sunk costs. As in 1994 and the previous deal with the US, NK access to development – either together with South Korea or through broader international cooperation – depends completely and transparently on the capping and rolling back of nuclear and missile systems. They have always known this. As long as a new agreement is structured so that the North can depend on follow-through from the US and ROK, they are likely to make the deal. There is no other way for them to climb out of their situation.
– Stephen Costello
Mr Costello seems to want to remove sanctions and give billions in aid to North Korea and hope for the best. Nowhere in his article does he mention the word denuclearisation, which is the main reason for talking to North Korea. The six-party talks ended in Sept. of 2007 when the North would not provide a full listing of their weapons as required by the terms of signed agreements. So direct talks ended ten and a half years ago not 17 or 15 years. North Korea is not facing the “best external environment in 17 years” but is under increasing sanctions that will begin to bite over time. Mr Costello claims that when diplomacy has worked in the past it was because of aid to North Korea, however diplomacy has not worked in the past, that’s why we are in the situation we are in now. North Korea has used talks for 24 years to buy time to build nuclear weapons and long range missiles. I believe Moon wants to restart the sunshine policy and give billions of dollars in aid to the North in exchange for nothing, and it could prove to be the death knell of South Korean democracy. On the day that happens the New York Post headline will be, South Korea dies from a bad batch of Moonshine.
Dennis,
Excellent last sentence.
As I noted, Kim Jung-un’s visit to Beijing should increase his confidence and make him even more likely to begin to bargain away his nuclear programs. That is in addition to the practical and credible position of Moon in Seoul and the weakness and desperation of Trump in Washington. The only bargains available will mean IAEA inspections, monitoring, and giving up the weapons. The process might take years, but it can be done. No one thinks such a process could be concluded during Trump’s term, although the IAEA head has just suggested that it could take 3 years.
The DPRK nuclear programs could fairly be called the Bush/Cheney/Bolton programs, since they were provoked and enabled by those officials. And one could argue that Kim Jung-un’s maximum pressure campaign – using dozens of missile launches and nuclear tests – has moved Trump to the table.
What seems clear is that only practical progressives in Seoul or Washington have the vision or courage to make a drive for the denuclearization of North Korea. Note that this does not include the strategic incoherence of Barack Obama. So progress here is not a left-right thing, but more a matter of wisdom, preparedness and leadership.
One of the easiest comparisons one could make would line up the costs of the arms build-ups, missile defenses, exercises and demonstrations of “strength” by the US and ROK, and compare them with the costs of traveling diplomats, modest energy aid, and leading the DPRK to a more normal economy. The gains from security would make the numbers not even close.
– Stephen Costello