The probable reasons for Kim Jong-un’s nuclear and missile tests, with their dangerous and destabilising regional impacts, have been clear for decades. Like his father and grandfather, Kim remembers the basic bargain embraced by the Agreed Framework of 1994 and seems determined to settle for nothing less. His refusal to be humiliated or criminalised — in his view — is tragically matched by the determination of US leaders since 2001 to accept nothing less than his humiliation or criminalisation. That is, after all, the reason President George W Bush and his party destroyed the Agreed Framework, according to their own books. Vice president Dick Cheney’s remarks at the time, ‘We don’t negotiate with evil; we defeat it’, were unmistakable.

President Trump was headed in this direction from the beginning. The only questions were when he would get here, and how bad it would be. Well, here we are, and it is pretty bad. As was the case with former South Korean president Park Geun-hye, who was impeached and then imprisoned five months ago, Trump has now made getting him out of office the most important goal for the US political and social system.

South Koreans know something about living with corrupt and dictatorial governments. But to paraphrase Leo Tolstoy, each bad government is bad in its own way — and each society and its leaders will react in their own different ways.

Accordingly, many Americans have been envious of the remarkable courage, focus, organisational ability and determination of the 17 million people who came out in Seoul’s Gwanghwamun Square for 11 Saturdays in a row, pushing their system to eject Park.

It may well be that the US system also needs the energy of millions of demonstrators to force the legal structures to play their roles after having been tested in ways not seen for a generation. The United States has its own sources of civic strength, and they too will now be increasingly called upon. But the United States needs its friends to stand up and help.

The US crisis is unique partly because its impacts are not just domestic. As has been made clear, it directly affects South and North Korea, China and Japan. The risk of conflict or war on the Korean peninsula was never great, but the effects of destabilisation and insecurity are massive and ongoing. The latest nuclear test by North Korea is an urgent reminder. As a result, particularly thoughtful reactions are called for from US friends and allies.

Some are already speaking up about both Trump’s dangerous and counter-productive threats and refusal to talk to Pyongyang, and about his failure to denounce racists and anti-immigrant forces in the United States. The leaders of China, Germany, the EU and Canada have all been clear in their statements.

South Korean President Moon Jae-in may feel that he should try to work with the US administration due to the high stakes on the Korean peninsula, and this may have so far prevented him from speaking ‘hard truths’ to Trump. That strategy always depended upon a degree of strategic wisdom and purpose from the White House — but wisdom and purpose have been hard to find in the US position for years. Trump’s recent call for scrapping the US–South Korea trade deal, and his labelling any diplomacy ‘appeasement’, should end for now any expectation that the United States retains a strategic understanding of issues surrounding the Korean peninsula. The time for a reassessment has come.

Trump administration policy directly blocks all negotiations with North Korea, and blocks South Korea from any role except following US policy. That was the policy’s intent. This reality makes Moon’s position untenable. Any long-standing US ally must confront Washington’s self-destructive and counter-productive policies. That is what leadership means today, and it is also what friendship with Washington means today.

Trump’s alleged promise to Moon that there will be no first strike by the United States is nice, but it is empty. There would never have been such a strike. The Chinese and Russians have been clear and public about this. Similarly, the reaffirmation of ‘prior consultation’ with the Blue House before any US action is also empty.

It is up to Americans to deal with their corrupt and destructive president. As South Korea knows, no one else has the right or responsibility to do so. This will take some time, during which the already small US capacity to help solve the North Korea puzzle will continue to shrink.

Given this waning US capacity, the time for Seoul to decide on a durable policy direction is now.

Seoul could begin by scaling back or reducing its joint military exercises with the United States. It would announce this and clearly state that it is intended to create the conditions for comprehensive diplomacy. Together with China and Russia, it could then press Pyongyang to freeze its missile and nuclear programs. South Korea can proceed to gather a coalition of powers, many of which are waiting for someone to organise this effort, to jointly spell out a roadmap for returning to stable security, diplomatic engagement and economic development in Northeast Asia.

Washington’s global pressure and isolation campaign will have to stop, and unconditional talks with North Korea need to begin. These are the two items that replaced the working Agreed Framework, and they should be reversed in order to return to an acceptable deal. Capping and rolling back the North’s weapons programs will be a medium-term goal, along with a permanent peace treaty to end the Korean War, ascension to UN and other international agreements, and other logical goals. A group of national leaders, organised by Seoul, can present this initiative to President Trump at the UN General Assembly in New York this month. A list of benefits to him and the United States could be colourfully described. Trump may still refuse to help, but the initiative should continue in his absence.

China, Japan, Russia and the UN all have good reasons to welcome Seoul’s lead on breaking this impasse, but none of them has the legitimacy, interest, flexibility or capacity to take the lead by themselves. Only South Korea does, and it can expect broad and robust cooperation.

For three months, South Korea has given up the rare and critical leverage it had, and therefore nothing it has said or done has moved any party. President Moon keeps saying he wants to lead. Now he could recover that leverage and actually do so.

Stephen Costello is an independent analyst and consultant and the producer of AsiaEast. He was formerly director of the Korea Program at the Atlantic Council, director of the Kim Dae Jung Peace Foundation, and vice president of Gowran International.

A version of this article was originally published here at the Korea Times.