The upgrade can be easily cast as Manila’s response to the increasing assertiveness of China over its territorial claims in the South China Sea (known as the West Philippine Sea in the Philippines). Currently, the most likely flashpoint has shifted to Ayungin Shoal following China’s demand that the Philippines remove a beached Filipino warship that it has converted into an outpost. Tensions between Manila and Beijing reached a tipping point in 2012 with a standoff in Scarborough Shoal when the Philippine Navy’s frigate BRP Gregorio Del Pilar attempted to expel Chinese fishing boats. The incident was framed by Beijing as a disproportionate use of the Philippine military, leading to China’s de facto control over the shoal.
Compared to the Philippines’ 2007 Capability Upgrade Program, which focused on basic move-shoot-communicate assets (such as handheld radios, body armour, troop carriers), recent acquisitions have a clear external defence orientation. This explains the focus on offshore patrol vessels (OPV) and aircraft purchases.
The reorientation is made possible by the winding down of internal security threats, which have preoccupied the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) over the last 12 years. Recent developments such as the signing of a peace agreement with the largest Muslim secessionist group in Mindanao, and the arrest of the top leadership of the communist insurgent movement, have highlighted the improved internal security situation. The current AFP counterinsurgency strategy calls for a phased transition to external defence that is to be completed by 2016.
Yet Manila’s shopping list remains limited by fiscal constraints. The two Del Pilar-class vessels, while adequate for Exclusive Economic Zone and offshore patrol vessel-type duties, carry similarly limited armaments to the Jacinto-class OPVs. The Jacintos prior to the Del Pilar, were then the PN’s most blue ocean-capable ships. The Del Pilar’s capability to conduct helicopter flight operations and stay on station longer is the only incremental improvement it has over the Jacintos. The addition of expensive systems such as anti-ship missiles and anti-submarine warfare equipment is highly contingent on additional funding.Concerns have been raised over whether supplemental funding for the AFP will continue after the end of President Aquino’s term in 2016. Aquino has a keen personal interest in military equipment and has thus provided an important impetus for greater defence resource allocation. A less enthusisatic President could translate into decreased defence spending and derail AFP modernisation.
The AFP also appears to want to diversify the capabilities of its prospective assets. It has sought to cast equipment acquisitions such as the AW109 PN Multipurpose Helicopter purchase, the Bell 412 Combat Utility Helicopter, and the Strategic Sealift Vessel as multi-use platforms.
As was demonstrated by the long lead-up to the signing of the FA-50 contract, there is more political resistance to equipment acquisitions that are primarily framed for warfighting. The apparent preference for multi-role assets is also understandable given the myriad of non-hostile military operations undertaken by the AFP such as disaster relief. But it must be stressed that such tasks act as a distraction from fully transitoning the AFP to external defence. Military involvement in duties other than warfighting are are symptomatic of the Philippines’ overall lack of civilian civil defence capability, specifically disaster search and rescue, and relief operations.
Given the fiscal and political context of the Philippines’ military modernisation, China’s concerns over the purported destabilising effect of Philippine modernisation appear to be unwarranted. While it is true that the purchases will likely complicate any expansionist move by Beijing, Manila’s purchases have remained consistent with its goal of obtaining a ‘minimal credible defence posture’. Territorial claims are best enforced through less belligerent acts, and having a presence in contested waters is still more important than sheer offensive capability. The Philippine government seems to have learnt its lesson from China’s de facto occupation of Scarborough and will seek to deny Beijing a pretext to take over Ayungin Shoal.
Manila could leverage a heavy-handed Chinese response, even by non-military assets, to its advantage. On 30 March 2014, a resupply mission to Ayungin Shoal—fully covered by the media—was used to underscore the narrative of a seemingly David and Goliath struggle between Manila and Beijing. But aside from a concerted PR push, Manila has also been pushing at the diplomatic front. In short, Manila seemed to have recognised the asymmetrical options it has at its disposal.
For now, as paradoxical as it may sound, the combination of a more cautious, albeit still assertive China, and a more credible Philippines may allow tensions in the South China Sea to simmer down.
Joseph Franco is an Associate Research Fellow from the S Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore.
“Territorial claims are best enforced through less belligerent acts, and having a presence in contested waters is still more important than sheer offensive capability”.
Where did you discover these non-facts. China and the Russian Federation, and indeed the United States, repeatedly demonstrate that precisely the opposite is true. Military power, and the willingness to deploy it, is what carries the day in territorial and maritime disputes.
When Muammar Qaddafi declared the Gulf of Sidra to be Libyan territorial waters, and off-limits to foreign navies, it was the United States Navy’s “sheer offensive capability” that decided the issue.
As for the Filipinos, it’ll take more than a few arms purchases to reverse their pathetic situation. Whatever constitutes their air force has not been on actual air patrol, virtually grounded, since 2005.
Think about that. A national “air force”… parked in hangars for nine years.
The Chinese are picking on their weakest neighbor. Like the Europeans, the Filipinos have presumed for two generations that they could rest comfortably in a hammock, allow their military to atrophy … and that the United States would carry the load of protecting their national sovereignty for them.
Compare Vietnam’s military position in the South China Sea, to whatever the Philippines does there. It’ll tell you all you need to know about what will happen over time to the Filipino position in that sea.
The United States is not going to war over Scarborough Shoal. The Filipinos will have to accept the indignities that China intends to impose upon them.
My bet is that the Philippines won’t have the guts to admit that they are fully responsible for what they will have to endure. It’ll be much easier to blame the United States for not protecting its informal protectorate.
I am not denying the fact that as you put it, the Philippine military is “pathetic”–even the insiders in the highest echelons of the defense establishment would make private jokes about the PAF being all “Air and no Force”.
Fact is, the AFP has long been haranguing the politicians in Malacanang and both chambers of the legislature for modernisation funds. I distinctly remember sitting in a 2010 Defense Committee hearing at the House of Representatives, with the VCSAFP bluntly pointing out how Congress utterly failed to provide funds as stipulated in the 1995 Modernization act (which by the way lapsed with only 10 percent of promised funds released). Note that even then, the 1995 AFPMA was quite modest in its objectives.
The AFP was allowed to atrophy and even one can say gutted by the politicians, with the very narrow notion that Uncle Sam will foot the bill. It is a good thing that some public intellectuals have been gaining audience in saying that no, the 1951 RP-US MDT does not cover the KIG and Bajo De Masinloc (GPH name for Scarborough).
The point I was trying to make is that the Philippines is making do with what limited resources it has, through asymmetrical approaches. No state in the area claimed by Beijing’s nine-dash claim would have the “sheer offensive capability” to ward off the PLA’s own “sheer military capability. For the Philippines, recapitilising its territorial defence capability will take a very long time.
In the interim, going for PR coups and international law is their best bet. Read up on how the recent resupply mission was played up and its proximity to Manila’s filing of a memorial to ITLOS.
I agree, a piece of paper or damning footage will most definitely not stop a detachment of PLAN Marines. But it is way better than letting the Philippine-controlled features to be taken by Beijing through force majeur.
Neither would a gung-ho, all-out PN deployment into the KIG would be the solution. Why give Beijing a convenient pretext to bring the hammer down? The PLAN has more vessels, with better sensors and firepower, and logistics in the area. Hence, the Philippines can play the more astute game similar to the Chinese play–get your white ships to show the flag.
And on the last point, they are already some rumblings to that effect. I find it totally disingenuous personally and professionally. But sadly, it is a reality. My hope is that
….today’s modest upgrades will shake the politicians from their stupor that defense comes at a cost. That independent policy require independent means. No one will fight for Filipino soil (or shoal) but Filipinos.
Cheers,
J
Perhaps it is actually the belief that “defense comes at a cost” without much direct benefit to the economy and peoples’ livelihoods, that has been hobbling the Philippines from investing more in its defense sector.
The article mentions, “Manila’s shopping list remains limited by fiscal constraints.”
This reinforces the notion that the Philippines is too poor to afford up-to-date equipment for the AFP. Yet looking at the World Bank, IMF and CIA rankings of world economies show us that many economically weaker countries in fact have better equipped military forces than the Philippines.
It is perhaps due to the AFP having become too dependent on hand-me-downs from the US, that the Philippines have yet to figure out how its defense procurement strategy could and should be a driver for economic growth, for the country as a whole.
It is still quite common for Philippine leaders to see almost any form of defense spending as money being lost to overseas vendors.
However, it should instead be seen as opportunities to create jobs locally… which in turn stimulates the economy… which in turn creates more business opportunities… which in turn increases government revenue… which in turn result in improved government services… which in turn creates more government contracts that more local businesses can compete for and win… and the cycle continues.
To boost its military while boosting its economy even more, the Philippines should seriously consider negotiating offset agreements with its overseas defense vendors.
Companies such as Saab have generous offset programs where countries that procure, say half a billion dollars of Gripen fighter jets can then enjoy at least half a billion dollars worth of investments from Sweden. This can also be in the form Saab investing in having the Gripens manufactured in the country buying them, resulting in technology transfer, job creation and greater self-sufficiency.
There were actually instances when offsets were even greater than the purchasing amount, resulting in even more economic benefits for the buying country.
In the end, there is corruption in every country. But there seems to be more of it in countries that do not provide its citizens ample opportunities to create wealth legally. Philippine leaders need to figure out how investing in its own defense can and should boost the Philippine economy.
Thank you very much.
Given the budget constraint but geographical advantages, the Philippines should blend air forces and navy upgrades with land based anti-ship missile capability and early detection systems. For a fraction of the fighter jet and/or vessel costs, these either mobile or stationary AMS’s can cover most if not all Chinese occupied features and/or encroaching hostile vessels without hardly any requirement for infrastructures and significant training. Additionally, whenever the Philippines succeeds in coordinating such missiles shields with Malaysia and Vietnam, they can together 1)Greatly, gain numerical advantages over any Chinese naval deployment without worrying about Chinese air forces. 2) Turn this defensive capacity into an immediate offensive deterrence to counter further Chinese aggressions.
That is a defence acquisition path that the AFP is actually looking at. But for the near-term, the real priority is to get hulls in the water. Not small missile armed boats whose utility is in a real shooting war but OPV-type vessels to play the more important “show the flag” missions. Think more a Cod War than a hot shooting war.