But Brussels’ preparedness to engage more thoroughly with East Asian affairs is growing, as recent proclamations demonstrate. This gradual maturing of the European Union’s Asia policy should be applauded, as the dearth of political engagement from Europe with the region has long been lamented by many in Europe, Asia and the United States alike. But it also raises the question of whether Brussels can reinforce its approach with deepened knowledge and further action.
Last November China declared an air defence identification zone over a large part of the East China Sea that has been at the centre of recent tensions between China, Taiwan and Japan. Like many other world leaders, EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Catherine Ashton issued a public statement to express the EU’s concern, commenting that the Chinese action ‘heightens the risk of escalation and contributes to raising tensions in the region’. Less than a month later Brussels released another statement, this time in response to the visit by Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe to the controversial Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo. The visit was seen by many in China, South Korea and elsewhere as a sign of denial of war crimes. A spokesperson for Ashton referred to Abe’s action as being ‘not conducive to lowering tensions or to improving relations with Japan’s neighbours’.
These recent proclamations by the EU demonstrate two things. First, the EU is not afraid to criticise the major Asian powers when it perceives their actions to be harmful to East Asia’s regional stability. And second, the EU is not taking sides with Japan against China or vice versa.
On both counts, the EU is reinforcing the trend towards greater outspokenness on Asian affairs that started in the summer of 2012, when Ashton and former US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton released a joint declaration on the need for closer trans-Atlantic co-ordination on security, development, well-being and prosperity in the Asia Pacific region. Next came a statement by Ashton alone, expressing concern about ‘developments’ in East Asia’s maritime areas. This largely implicit reference to the islands dispute between China, Taiwan and Japan did not mention any of these actors by name or take a position on their actions. The muted diplomatic tone that characterised these first statements has now been replaced by more explicit language.
These moves should not be discarded as mere wordplay. Official statements do have the potential to influence states’ behaviour and to shape norms of international conflict management. East Asia in particular lacks actors that are sufficiently detached from regional security issues and yet influential enough to sound an independent voice. High Representative Ashton’s public statements are part of an increasingly active EU positioning towards East Asian security affairs. The groundwork for the current approach was laid in June 2012, when European member states agreed on new guidelines for their foreign and security policy towards East Asia. Since then, Ashton has attended several high-level multilateral meetings on security issues in the region and has signed the Treaty on Amity and Co-operation in Southeast Asia, which strengthens the EU’s ties with ASEAN. During Ashton’s first visit to the ASEAN Secretariat, she also visited the new EU-ASEAN Cooperation Office based there.
The growing activism on the part of the EU raises the question of whether it will also speak out in the future if the United States acts in a way that threatens stability in East Asia. Displaying a preparedness to do so would be the logical next step in becoming an independent player in Asian affairs, and would further strengthen the EU’s image as a neutral but engaged stakeholder in East Asian stability.
Gradually, and without attracting much attention, the EU is building a strategy for East Asian security affairs that is more focused and ambitious than it has ever been. Even without a military presence in the region the EU can make a difference. The challenge now is for Brussels to keep up its engagement, develop an independent voice, and to uphold a long-term commitment to strengthening stability in the region. Asian governments have not hidden their disappointment with the EU about its rather half-hearted approach in past decades, but they may well be willing to give the EU a second chance — one that should not be wasted.
Maaike Okano-Heijmans and Frans-Paul van der Putten are senior research fellows at the Clingendael Institute in The Hague.
Question: is it not a bit strange to call for deep involvement of the EU in the economic and political security of East Asia?
Why?
1) the EU is struggling for its very survival, which is far from secured;
2) its neighborhood and partnership policy is in disarray, not just due to recent events in Ukraine; its Southern neighbors are disarray just as the larger Sahel region.
3) the entity is divided amongst its major power members about its external orientation; [ France looking south and reorients to the US; Germany looks east]
4) the EU major power members are tied to the US through [ global] NATO. Its security involvement in East Asia will be locally perceived that way, more in particular because the US aims to bring NATO military forces to the East Asian region; [see the global mission of the JSF and the inability of buyers in Europe to use the plane without US consent ]
5)Is it in EU’s economic interest to join the US in its objective to divide the region into two competing trade blocks [ RCEP versus TPP ]?
6) the EU policy of austerity has lead to a shrinking military budget.
To argue for more EU involvement in Asia’s security is not to argue for physical (military) presence, which is indeed very costly and thereby one important reason why the EU should not go there. We wholeheartedly agree that such investments should indeed be used to secure Europe’s own neighbourhood.
The argument set forward here is that more EU involvement in Asia should be largely political, including by being present at multilateral meetings and by making its voice heard in issues of concern to governments and peoples in Asia. The commitment should be for the long term and will thereby certainly not be without (financial and perhaps political) cost, but costs will be minor as compared to the required investment and expected return, in a region that is fast becoming the main global playground, home to key players that – by the way – also have a major stake in stability in Europe’s own neighborhood.