These commitments are critical given that scattered around the globe there are 1600 tonnes of highly enriched uranium and 500 tonnes of plutonium, which is enough to produce more than 126,000 nuclear weapons.
The Seoul NSS produced many accomplishments. Thirty-two of the 53 participating countries announced either their progress toward nuclear security since the first NSS, or their plans to work toward nuclear security in the future. For example, since the summit in Washington two years ago, the US and Russia have converted 3000 nuclear bombs worth of highly enriched uranium (HEU) to low-enriched uranium. Also, Kazakhstan announced that with the help of Russia, the US, the UK and the International Atomic Energy Agency, it has stored all its spent nuclear fuel (enough to make several hundred nuclear weapons) in new, safe facilities.
The 53 governments agreed that by the end of 2013 the relevant nations would ‘announce voluntary specific actions intended to minimise the use of HEU’ by, for example, converting reactors from highly enriched to low-enriched uranium. Eight nations, including Ukraine, promised either to dispose of or return 400 kilograms of HEU to the US. All participating nations were also urged to ratify the 2005 Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material by 2014.
In order to prevent loss or theft of nuclear materials, the Seoul communiqué suggested establishing an inventory to keep track of each country’s nuclear materials. But despite the actions taken and the pledges made by many of the participating countries in the second NSS, there remain many challenges.
First and foremost is whether the existing and future nuclear materials can really be controlled. The leaders at the Seoul NSS made political commitments to nuclear security, which the communiqué hailed as ‘substantive progress’. Bringing the issue of nuclear security to the attention of government leaders is a step in the right direction, because a high-level commitment will facilitate the execution of government decisions. But, at the same time, most of these commitments are voluntary rather than legally binding, which may affect the prospects of achieving nuclear security in the future.
A second challenge is the link between nuclear security and nuclear safety, an issue that has received much attention following the crisis at Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant. Japan’s nuclear crisis has prompted the international community to consider developing precautions to ensure nuclear safety during a natural disaster. It has also revealed the potential vulnerability of power plants to nuclear terrorism, as terrorists need only damage a nuclear plant’s cooling systems to do great harm.
A third challenge is whether the Seoul NSS actually helped reduce nuclear tension in East Asia. So far, it has not. As expected, North Korea did not send a representative to Seoul. Instead, 10 days before the summit, Pyongyang announced its plans to launch a long-range missile, which it called a ‘satellite’, to celebrate the centenary of President Kim Il-sung’s birth.
A fourth challenge is China, India and Pakistan, which did send representatives to Seoul, but which are believed to be expanding their nuclear arsenals, clearly contradicting the summit’s intent. Given that the summit’s purpose is not disarmament but nuclear security, there were no attempts to persuade these countries to reduce their arsenals, nor to negotiate with countries such as India and Pakistan to join the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and abandon their nuclear weapons.
A final challenge is that the main weakness of the NSS is that its agreements are not legally binding. On its own, this may call into question the continuity of the summit, which risks being permanently discontinued if Mitt Romney is elected president of the US. In any case, the NSS should be continued even if under a different pretext. Looking forward to the next summit in 2014, to be held in the Netherlands, it is crucial that all states take their NSS commitments seriously and keep momentum on the enormous challenges that nuclear security presents.
Masashi Nishihara is President at the Research Institute for Peace and Security, Tokyo.