Another avid tea-drinking country, Japan, will also be closely watching the contest’s outcome. Though Tokyo is excruciatingly circumspect in keeping aloof from Taiwan’s electoral politics and foreign policy so as not to provoke Beijing, indicators are that they might quietly favour a DPP victory. Indeed, on 4 October 2011 Mrs Tsai visited Tokyo to give a speech at the Foreign Correspondents’ Club of Japan, in which she highlighted her superior democratic credentials, her attachment to close ties with Japan and her determination not to disrupt the stable nature of cross-strait relations achieved under President Ma.
Though the main competition will be fought on the domestic battleground of Taiwan, Mrs Tsai’s visit was a strong signal of her party’s commitment to the Tokyo-Taipei bilateral relationship. As Beijing continues to press on Taiwan’s international space, Taipei has traditionally looked to Tokyo for support — viewed as second only to the US as an ‘ally’ of the beleaguered island nation.
Taiwan and Japan have long enjoyed a close, though unofficial, diplomatic relationship. Japan, like most countries, withholds recognition of the Republic of China (ROC) in Taiwan. But this has not prevented deep economic collaboration and tacit support for Taipei’s international position. For Tokyo, it is also an inescapable fact that Taiwan is geostrategically located so as to be vital to Japan’s territorial security.
But the main pillar of the relationship is economic; the two countries enjoyed bilateral trade worth US$70 billion in 2010. Their supply chains are quite interdependent, as demonstrated after the 2011 Tohoku earthquake and tsunami in Japan, which disrupted Taiwan’s production lines. Further, Japan has been a major contributor in the field of technology transfer and infrastructure in Taiwan. The Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement between Taiwan and China provides further opportunities to deepen this linkage. Indeed, President Ma called for Taiwan and Japan to enter China as partners. There have also been calls for an FTA by advocates in both Taiwan and Japan.
Underwriting this close economic cooperation are political, historical and cultural ties. Japan’s commitment to Taiwan is demonstrated through experienced diplomats in residence at Japan’s unofficial embassy and the frequent visits of former Japanese prime ministers to Taiwan. Taiwanese leaders from both parties have also long maintained a friendly disposition toward Japan. President Ma has recently been compelled to quash rumours of being ‘anti-Japanese’ and proclaimed himself ‘Japan’s best friend’. He acted mildly during the 2010 Senkaku fishing trawler collision crisis, refusing to cooperate with Beijing and keeping censure of Japan to a minimum. This welcome restraint did not go unnoticed by Tokyo as its leaders dealt with hostile rhetoric and economic reprisals from the mainland.
Yet while all of this is heartening for Taiwan’s policy makers, it is no substitute for a firm Japanese commitment to the maintenance of the ROC’s security. At present it is impossible to build an explicit bilateral military alliance. With this goal out of reach, Tokyo and Taipei could seek instead to develop their cooperation on ‘non-traditional’ security issues, such as pandemic diseases, transnational crime or natural disasters. The vulnerability of Taiwan and Japan to extreme weather systems would make potential bilateral cooperation in this sector highly appealing and serve to consolidate their ties.
How might this relationship evolve as a result of the January elections? Japan will remain a priority for both the KMT and DPP, though the latter will seek to avoid entering further into China’s embrace and should see Japan as a useful counterweight to this. Yet, despite its unspoken preference for a DPP government, Tokyo has learnt to live with President Ma and will continue to cooperate. Should Tsai lead the DPP to victory, she may use the time between her appointment and the Chinese Communist Party leadership transfer in late 2012 to effect modest improvements in bilateral relations with Japan. Excepting any radical initiative, Beijing will likely tolerate this, since they will not want any crisis to disrupt the smooth leadership transition. Washington will undoubtedly be satisfied with either candidate. Beijing, on the other hand, has a clear preference for Ma; they are comfortable with him and the KMT, and correctly see him as more committed to faster reconciliation between the two Chinese territories. Still, Tsai has been at pains to reassure Beijing (and Washington) that she will not do anything to rock the boat.
No one can precisely forecast what the respective contests and potential leadership transfers in Taiwan, China and the US will entail for East Asian security. But we can be sure that none of the relevant parties will deliberately seek confrontation at a sensitive time in domestic politics. Moreover, whichever party wins the Taiwanese election, it will likely remain committed to consolidating, or even expanding, the strong bilateral relationship with Tokyo.
Thomas Wilkins is a Senior Lecturer at the Centre for International Security Studies, University of Sydney.