The problem is that Kim Jong-il’s regime has absolutely no intention of surrendering its weapons program, which has been in development for half a century.
Indeed, why should Pyongyang leaders ever consider denuclearisation? The nuclear threat is the only reason why this tiny country matters on the international scene. These arms are the leverage North Korean diplomats have to squeeze unconditional aid from the West.
Between 1996 and 2010, Pyongyang received almost one million tons of free grain per year. While the international community keeps hinting that a massive aid package would follow denuclearisation, Pyongyang decision makers are not interested — why sell the cow now when it is producing so much milk?
On top of that, dramatic events in Libya have confirmed the Kim regime’s worst fears. For years, Western negotiators told North Korean leaders they would enjoy prosperity, security and manifold advantages of good relations with the outside world if only they emulated the wisdom of Moammar Gadhafi in giving up his nuclear weapons. The North Koreans did not listen then and they certainly are not going to listen now that recent events have validated their skepticism.
Had Saddam Hussein really had nuclear weapons, he would still be living in his luxurious palace, Pyongyang has often pointed out. Contrast this with the sorry fate of Gadhafi: his country has been invaded, his family members are dead and he is in hiding.
Though Pyongyang refuses to denuclearise, it may still be willing to strike a compromise deal to freeze or slightly downsize its nuclear program — though it will not surrender fissile material. Needless to say, they expect to be paid handsomely for this. It should be noted such treaties have no binding power over Pyongyang, which will only comply as long as the aid keeps flowing in.
Right now, however, the international community probably won’t accede to such compromises, because it will not want to be seen as succumbing to Pyongyang’s blackmail. North Korea is so far the only state which signed the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, but then withdrew and successfully developed a nuclear device. If it manages to keep its nuclear arsenal while still milking the US for aid, it will set a dangerous precedent.
The good news for Pyongyang, though, is that time is on its side. Sooner or later it will become clear to the US and to South Korea that sanctions are not working. Indeed, the last few years have seen a moderate improvement in North Korea’s economy. Meanwhile, North Korean engineers are working harder to produce enriched uranium and perfect their nuclear devices and ballistic missiles, perhaps even sharing insights with overseas friends, such as Burma. A few more nuclear tests, missile launches and proliferation attempts are all it will take to rattle the West’s current policy of benevolent neglect. At that point, Washington, Seoul and others will cave in.
Hence, the long-term solution of the talks will be some kind of arms restriction deal in which Pyongyang is forced to freeze its nuclear program and dismantle existing nuclear facilities for a hefty fee — with the implicit or explicit assumption that some fissile material and nuclear devices would remain hidden somewhere. This deal has its obvious shortcomings, but, given the alternatives, it is better than nothing.
Andrei Lankov is Professor at Kookmin University in Seoul.
This article was first published here in the Wall Street Journal.