Ever since the generals took back direct political power in 1988, and launched an ambitious military expansion and modernisation program, strategic analysts and other observers have been trying to determine how many Burmese men and women are in uniform. Numerous estimates have been put forward, but none can be considered definitive.
Most Burma-watchers acknowledge that over the past 20 years the Tatmadaw has grown dramatically, from a baseline of around 200,000. According to one Burmese academic, who appears to have had access to official records, in 1988 the army numbered 184,029, the navy 8065 and the air force 6587.
In 1995, the military government announced a ‘war establishment’ of 500,000. This formal goal was later revised to 600,000. This reportedly includes 23,000 in the air force and 22,000 in the navy. But these figures are purely notional, and are clearly well above the Tatmadaw’s current ‘implemented strength’ — although in 1999 one Thai newspaper claimed that there were 620,000 in Burma’s armed forces.
By 2002, it was widely accepted that the Tatmadaw had at least doubled in size, to around 400,000. This figure was thought to consist of about 370,000 in the army, 16,000 in the navy and 15,000 in the air force. A few reports have put the total number at 488,000, but this seems to include the 72,000 men and women believed to make up the country’s paramilitary police force.
The anonymous Wikipedia entry for the Tatmadaw gives an active strength of 492,000, but does not give any basis for this claim.
Even at about 400,000, the Tatmadaw would still be the second largest armed force in Southeast Asia (after Vietnam) and, by some counts, the 12th largest in the world. If the Wikipedia claim is closer to the mark — which is highly unlikely — it would be the largest in Southeast Asia and the 9th largest in the world.
Figures like 400,000 and 500,000 are still widely cited, but in recent years the size of Burma’s armed forces appears to have declined, probably to around 350,000. Some observers have claimed the figure is now closer to 300,000, and a few believe it could be even lower. These estimates seem to be based on persistent reports of desertions, the difficulty of attracting new recruits, and the large number of child soldiers in the ranks.
In addition, many Burma Army units appear to be badly under strength. In 1988 the formal establishment of each infantry battalion was 750 personnel, a figure later increased to 826. Yet in 2006 one Western source claimed — on the basis of leaked government documents — that 220 army battalions were staffed with just 200-300 men, while the remaining 284 battalions each had fewer than 200 members.
The difficulty of making sensible estimates of personnel numbers has been exacerbated by rampant corruption, bureaucratic inefficiency and generally poor record-keeping.
Tatmadaw recruiting stations are known to have falsified their records to win bonuses or to avoid punishment for poor performance. At the unit level, payrolls have been padded with non-existent personnel in order to siphon off funds and resources. Junior officers have apparently been afraid to report desertions to their seniors, for fear of retribution. Many soldiers have allegedly deserted, or ‘defected’ to insurgent groups.
Given the fact that military manpower estimates now range from less than 300,000 to over 600,000 — a difference of more than a quarter of a million people — it would be a very bold analyst who claimed to know the number of men and women serving in Burma’s armed forces. The current estimate of 350,000 seems to be broadly ‘in the ballpark’, but it is unlikely that anyone — possibly even including the Tatmadaw’s senior leadership — knows the real size of Burma’s armed forces.
Then again, it is not the size of the Tatmadaw that really matters, but what it is able and willing to do to enforce the military government’s will over the civilian population. Looking back over Burma’s recent history, in particular the army’s harsh response to the 2007 ‘saffron revolution’, that appears to be almost anything.
Andrew Selth is a research fellow at the Griffith Asia Institute.