[Full disclosure: I have met with Nagashima on a number of occasions.]
In response, Nagashima was warned by his superior, Defense Minister Kitazawa Toshimi, by Consumer Affairs Minister and Social Democratic Party head Fukushima Mizuho, and most significantly, by Hirano Hirofumi, the chief cabinet secretary, who stressed that it is for the government to decide policy in this area. In a meeting Wednesday morning Hirano advised caution from Nagashima.
Perhaps Nagashima should not have used a speech in his constituency to advance an argument for a position that appeared to be at odds with the government’s. (I say appeared because officially the government’s position on Afghanistan remains to be decided — all we know is that the refueling mission will not be “simply” extended.) But just as was the case with Kamei Shizuka’s comments about the debt repayment moratorium for small- and medium-sized enterprises, every note of discord within the Hatoyama government should not be a cause for alarm and an occasion for critics to declare that the government is out of control. As I’ve argued before, no government is free of disagreement: the important thing is how dissent is handled.
As the Hatoyama government decides what to do about Afghanistan — it will need to be in a position to offer something to Obama when he visits Japan — Nagashima should be included in the discussion on the basis of his distinct position on the issue, and the fact that he is well-connected in Washington (not to mention his substantial security policy expertise). And I suspect he will contribute to the debate within the government, although perhaps in a less visible manner henceforth. Simply silencing dissenters (if that’s even the right word) will not be to the government’s benefit.
The problem for the government on Futenma is different, being less a matter of dealing with internal disagreements than with the uncomfortable reality that the Hatoyama government is trapped between a US government uninterested in renegotiating and an Okinawan public that wants the matter resolved. Accordingly, Prime Minister Hatoyama Yukio hinted that the DPJ would be willing to reconsider its position and accept the bilateral agreement on realignment. Bloomberg reports that US Ambassador to Japan John Roos said that the Obama administration will not renegotiate the agreement on relocating Futenma, although from the article it is unclear whether the administration is opposed to renegotiating entirely or whether it is simply opposed to the idea of relocating the air base to somewhere outside of Okinawa entirely; Roos apparently said that the administration will listen to the Hatoyama government’s position.
For its part, the Hatoyama government, while still interested in finding a solution other than building an offshore replacement facility in Okinawa, may be softening its position. Not only did Hatoyama allude to the possibility of abandoning a manifesto position, but after an inspection visit to Okinawa Kitazawa said that the idea of relocating the Marine air station outside of Okinawa, the position espoused in the DPJ’s Okinawa vision paper, is extremely difficult. The government is still considering whether to propose an alternative site within Okinawa, but it seems that the DPJ-led government will not push quite as hard for its optimal plan.
Dealing with these issues now is good politics. Not only will it give some meaning to Obama’s visit next month — Okada stressed in an appearance on NHK last month that the government wants to assemble its policies on Okinawa, refueling, and Afghanistan by Obama’s visit — but it will also push foreign policy out of the headlines after Obama leaves and the DPJ devotes its attention entirely to drafting next year’s budget and finding ways to pay for its new spending programs. Its coalition partners will undoubtedly complain about the inevitable compromises the DPJ will make in relations with the US, but dealing with these matters now will make it that much harder for the LDP to gain traction against the DPJ by attacking the government on its handling of foreign policy in advance of next year’s upper house election. By dealing with these tricky issues now the Hatoyama government can ensure that nothing will detract from encomiums to the alliance during next year’s sixtieth anniversary celebrations.
It is unlikely that the DPJ will do anything to spoil next year’s celebrations in the meantime. Far from the oft-heard criticism that the DPJ is reflexively anti-American, the Hatoyama government is showing that the flexibility it showed during the campaign was not a pose. The DPJ is willing to compromise with the US. It recognizes that there are limits to the political usefulness of criticizing Washington. The government’s compromise position has yet to take shape, but there seems little question now that it will be a compromise position.
Nagashima Akihisa’s outspoken comment that the refueling mission ought to continue (albeit with a new mandate from the Diet) shows that he just doesn’t get it. One of the keys to the Westminster system (to which the Hatoyama government aspires) is cabinet decision-making and cabinet solidarity. This means that any member of the ministerial team in the ruling party, including the most junior parliamentary secretaries, are bound by conventions of cabinet solidarity, i.e. expressing no public disagreement with the government’s line. Any such public display of policy independence or dissent should be accompanied by a return to the back bench. Nagashima was rightly rebuked by his boss and others including the Chief Cabinet Secretary. He seems to be trying to carve out an independent policy profile for himself, while retaining membership of the ministry. His position is quite different from Kamei’s, who is a minister in his own right, but who should nevertheless reflect the collective government position and not his own independent political/policy standpoint (it seems the instinct for pork-barrelling dies hard). If Hatoyama and his colleagues are really serious about reform of the system, they should promptly demand either retraction or resignation at the first sign of any dissent from the government line.
As far as Japan’s ‘contribution’ to Afghanistan (and ‘war on terrorism’) goes, Okada’s recent visit there is highly significant. Japan’s future contribution, as yet unspecified, will, no doubt, hinge on a financial outlay, probably to civilian causes, such as health and education. This may replace the Indian Ocean deployment and represent a return to the ‘gift’ diplomacy of yore (for the occasion of Obama’s visit) and ‘chequebook’ diplomacy (to the international community).
On the issue of Futenma – there have been several reports of various American spokespersons saying that the Obama administration will not renegotiate the agreement on relocating Futenma, including Roos’ comment cited by Tobias Harris above. However, on his visits to Japan, Kurt Campbell has shown willingness to listen to the Hatoyama government’s views on the matter. He has also commented on how important it was for Japan and the United States to respect each other as ‘equals’. Futenma represents an opportunity for the United States to put this rhetoric into practice. Moreover, from a practical point of view, it would be impossible for the United States to enforce the existing agreement on Futenma without Japanese cooperation.