But this apparent forward movement hides a lot of real slippage. The Ground Self Defence Forces are out of Iraq and the Air Self Defence Forces cargo and personnel transport mission is likely to be discontinued. In the Indian Ocean, the Opposition under Ichiro Ozawa has used every tactic to block the continued dispatch of the Maritime Self Defence forces supply ships servicing the international flotilla providing security there.

While the US-Japan security relationship is anchored in shared interests and shared values, given where it is really at, to expect it will remain unchanged is widely unrealistic. ‘Establishing a strong working relationship with the new administration will require the demonstration of a firm commitment to a flexible and pro-active stance toward the security challenges facing the two countries’ argues Okamoto.

Most discussions in the Japanese security community start and end with talk of deepening and broadening the security relationship. This really means identifying the things that need to be done to achieve greater integration of US military and SDF activities, or push the psychological and legal envelope for the SDF through reinterpretations of the Constitution.

Okamoto reckons that a more realistic and strategic approach to enhance the alliance and its image in Washington would be for Japan to demonstrate a greater self-reliance and autonomy in security affairs.

His priorities:

1. Japan should commit to greater efforts in providing security for Japanese nationals living and working overseas (for example, by assigning contingents of Self Defence Forces personnel to guard Japan’s embassies and consulates , such as in Baghdad).
2. Japan should commit to sending teams of soldiers and police officers to protect aid workers and civil service personnel to serve in Provincial Reconstruction Teams as in Afghanistan.
3. Japan should use the improved ability of the SDF (through the acquisition of Hyuga-class escort ships with their capacity for sustained helicopter operations) to possibly provide mass evacuation and other humanitarian relief services.
4. Japan needs to demonstrate a pro-active stance toward its security it should craft a permanent, national commitment, enshrined in law, to JMSDF participation in security operations guarding safe passage of ships on the open ocean.
5. Japan should publicly reaffirm also that it has not forgotten the broad lesson of September 11: ‘that under the guise of pious devotion to Islam, desperate and merciless networks of intolerant, international criminals are engaged in a private war against contemporary life’. Verbal commitment, Okamoto notes, is no substitute for the dispatch of actual forces, of course but ‘an announcement of a willingness to stand shoulder-to-shoulder with the allies in the fight against Al Qaeda and other terrorists will ready the public mind for more advanced legislation’.

Most, if not all, of these priorities might seem a pretty easy sell. The shift from  ‘collective defence cooperation’ to ‘international security cooperation’ that Okamoto suggests deals with some of the tricky constitutional issues though not all and assigns Japan an active and positive role that would seem defensible at home. But, given the political gridlock in Tokyo, none of them will be.

There are still questions about how to handle the constitutional issues that some of these priorities raise and about alternative frameworks within which to achieve their objectives (for example. Opposition leader Ozawa might buy some of the more adventurous elements if they were tied to the UN framework but not otherwise).

But at least there you have a clear statement of the wish-list of one of Japan’s most respected defence experts and security gurus.

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See also:
Japan assesses the next US presidency
Obama and Asia
What Obama means for Asia
Managing the Japan-US alliance
Keeping up with Asia
More on Japan, America and the bomb
China, Japanese security and the bomb!