Tanaka argues that neither leaving the abductees issue unsettled nor shelving it in order to normalize Japan’s relations with North Korea is a feasible policy option for Japan:
It was exactly this lack of options that led Japan to carry out intense behind-the-scenes diplomacy with North Korea several years ago. Negotiations culminated in a 2002 summit meeting and the Pyongyang Declaration. North Korea formally acknowledged that the abductions had taken place and allowed five survivors to return to Japan. Later, an agreement was formulated through the Six-Party Talks that reiterated that diplomatic normalization between Japan and North Korea would be carried out in a manner consistent with the Pyongyang Declaration. The basic concept of this aspect of the ‘comprehensive resolution’ is that without a resolution of the abductees issue there will be no normalization and without normalization there will be no final resolution of the nuclear issue.
Progress in resolving the abductees issue will come along with further progress toward a resolution of the nuclear issue. Conversely, there may be no progress on the abductees issue if negotiations concerning the nuclear issue stall. Thus, in addition to strengthening linkages with the other nations involved in the Six-Party Talks and working with them to resolve the nuclear issue, Japan must also push forward comprehensive bilateral negotiations that cover more than only the abductees issue…..
It is also important for Japan to clarify what exactly a resolution of the abductees issue would entail. The primary precondition for a resolution is ‘verification of the facts.’ The North Korean side must provide detailed and verifiable information detailing how many Japanese were abducted and what happened to them. It must also promptly return any victims who are still alive. Japanese police and—depending on the circumstances—international institutions should be involved in this process. Determining what happened to the abductees in a verifiable manner will open the door to a final resolution of the issue.
Whether Tanaka’s reasoned position on ‘first-things-first’ will prevail in Japanese diplomacy at this point may become clearer following the US decision to de-list North Korea as a terrorist state around the intense diplomatic activity that is taking place in Washington and Tokyo over the coming days.
Remarkably, it is the Japan problem more rather than uncertainties about North Korean leader, Kim Jong Il’s health and intelligence reports of activity that could portend another North Korean test that appears to have phased the American negotiators over the last few days. These rapidly evolving developments recommend, as I argued recently, that Australia should not sit on the sidelines any longer but use all the assets it has to deal itself into a game that could evolve very rapidly and have profound effects on our strategic interests in Northeast Asia and across the region more broadly.