Abe and Aso are clearly different from Fukuda in their flirtation with ‘values-based diplomacy’, ‘the arc of freedom and prosperity’ and the quadrilateral initiative with the Howard Government in Australia, the United States, and India. Japan’s (and perhaps Australia’s) deep economic relations with China made that an unrealistic diplomatic play for Japan. A core stream in the foreign policy establishment was never comfortable with the posturing against Japan and Fukuda was quick to withdraw the idea when he came to power. The Howard Government appears to have misread this underlying element in Japan’ strategic positioning, although clearly it is not alone in that.
In Australia some still over-emphasise the difference between Japan and Australia on China. Yet both countries are the same boat in that they welcome a peaceful rise of China as a ‘responsible stake holder’ in international society. A core stream in thinking in Australia and Japan is very different from a dominant stream in thinking in the United States about the rise of China and no one should be confused by the exception of the Abe-Aso camp.
Indeed Australia’s and Japan’s engagement of China is very similar.
Only one of the two countries, however, can rely on that as a viable long-term strategy.
For Australia, the future of Sino relations can afford an ‘agree to disagree’ approach when we don’t see eye to eye. In return Australia benefits hugely from areas where we are aligned, to say nothing of trade.
This includes a more diverse demographic culturally (which has been mentioned on this blog), and a promotion of Chinese language & society domestically. Most importantly, this can be seen as the beginning of the broader Australian-Sino relationship into the future. With a Mandarin speaking Prime Minister, its a very good start. Also, we are insulated from those issues that are important to the Chinese government — sovereignty and territorial integrity.
Contrast this with Japan. The Chinese have a long memory for wartime atrocities, Nanjing etc. They are deeply offended by what they perceive as the brushing over of Japanese Militarism in Asia in school textbooks, and the denials over comfort women. Illustrate this with contemporary Japanese attitudes towards the Yasukumi Shrine and, well, Japan has a lot more baggage.
Combine this with Japan’s proximity and you have an even more serious problem. Unlike Australia, Japan is much more exposed to Chinese values as seen in the East China Sea dispute and a myriad of others. The Sino-Japanese mutual distrust strategically only adds fuel to the fire.
So yes, on paper our engagements are similar. But only one of us will do so successfully over the next 50 years or so. Japan desperately needs to re-evaluate its own bilateral relationship. There is every reason to suggest that Australia-Japan relations will be good. There is every reason to suggest that Australia-Sino relations will be good. Yet nothing that gives Japan that same luxury or confidence going forward with China.
I agree with Crispin Rovere in that Japan has a set of difficult and long-standing strategic issues in the relations with China, most of which Australia does not share. At this point, Australia-China and Japan-China relations look different.
However, I think Rovere’s argument that Australia can rely on engagement to China as a viable long-term strategy is misleading or simplistic. The overall strategy that Australia should and is having vis-à-vis China is much more complicated than a simple reliance on engagement.
Examples lie everywhere in the Asia-Pacific. First, the increasing presence of China in South Pacific requires Australia to move beyond a simple engagement. Forging the common understanding of democratic values and good governance as a principle in the nation-state development in South Pacific will become even more fundamentally important to not only engage China but also arrange a regional (multilateral) situation which conditions Chinese behavior and particularly their development assistance. Bolstering the leadership position that Australia traditionally enjoys in South Pacific is another necessity in terms of balance of influence. In this context, it is noteworthy that currently Australia and Japan are seeking Japan’s participation in RAMSI and other missions in South Pacific, so that Japan, who shares a lot with Australia, supports Australian strategic interests in South Pacific. This only looks more important in the face of the rising influence of China in South Pacific as Australia sees it against its strategic interest to see the increase of influence of any external powers, especially the one who does not share political values and international position; whether or not democracy and the U.S. ally.
Over the series of preparatory meetings for East Asia Summit, it became obvious that the China’s regional foreign policy could undermine the interests of other states such as Australia. The exclusive and closed region, which Chinese behavior suggests to envision, is a vision that Australia needs to balance against. This is exactly why Howard government decided to join EAS and current Rudd government continues to engage this “multilateral instrumentality.” Australia’s strong push for Asia-Pacific wide community building, mainly through APEC, is not only a policy in economic but also strategic terms. Australia’s alliance relationship with U.S. operates more smoothly within a region which includes U.S. than that excludes it. The narrow grouping which China seems to aspire to build is clearly against this fundamental interest that Australia has with U.S.
These examples do not suggest that Australia needs to take containment policy, but that engagement is not enough. Balancing and hedging are necessary. Yes, Japan has many more and more difficult problems with China. But still Australia-China and Japan’s China relations look more similar than Crispin Rovere suggested.
Indeed, Japan cannot and are not expecting Australia to firmly support Japan’s position over the territorial dispute, for example, with China. But, as Tomohiko Satake argued, the core of the Japan’s China strategy remains engagement as that of Australia does. And as I discussed in many issues that require Australia and Japan to take balancing and hedging policies (not only engagement) vis-à-vis China, Australia and Japan converge rather than diverge.