Earlier this year North Korea declared that it has ‘passed through the gate’ to prosperity on the way to its self-professed goal of becoming a strong and prosperous nation (Kangsong Taeguk). Yet there are signs that within North Korea’s closed borders the domestic situation is deteriorating and the regime is taking every opportunity to earn desperately needed cash and goods through the activities of its government agencies.

Given this backdrop, the incident that unfolded in the Yellow Sea on 8 May 2012 is especially significant, as 29 Chinese fishermen aboard three Chinese fishing boats were abducted by unidentified and armed North Koreans, who demanded a ransom for their return. The vessels were seized in a traditional Chinese fishing area, about 10 nautical miles from the maritime boundary between the two countries. Seven Chinese boats were initially taken; four were later returned to the Chinese port of Dandong in return for ransom. Three Chinese boats remained in the hands of the unnamed North Korean kidnappers for another 13 days.

While such incidents are common, this one developed in an unusual way. This time, the armed hijackers approached the Chinese fishing vessels on a speed-boat and wore blue hats and uniforms — some of them also spoke perfect Mandarin. The abductors initially demanded a payment of RMB400,000 (US$63,000) for each boat, although they later lowered their request. The crew members transmitted the demand by satellite phones, were kept in captivity on shore without food and were reportedly subjected to beatings. That the captors gave the kidnapped sailors the mobile number of an intermediary in Dandong to discuss how to send the ransom initially suggested they were part of an international group of pirates.

For some 10 days the Chinese government worked closely with the North Korean maritime authorities to ensure the safety of the Chinese citizens. Yet Pyongyang has still not commented on the incident. And while the situation remains unclear, the abduction came after Beijing criticised a recent North Korean rocket launch and expressed concern over another possible nuclear weapons test. This raises a very serious question: were the hijackers pirates or was this in fact a carefully planned retaliation by the North Korean government against China?

North Korean defectors who are familiar with the chain of command in maritime border protection assert that the three Chinese fishing boats were seized by operatives of North Korea’s General Bureau of Reconnaissance. They often use armed speed-boats and secretly enter international waters to fulfil special missions. The involvement of Chinese criminals in this particular incident is unlikely, while staff members of the General Bureau of Reconnaissance are fluent in Mandarin because they are trained to operate in Chinese waters.

Might the bureau have decided upon the capture of Chinese fishing boats simply to earn money? Capturing foreign nationals and their property would inevitably create a diplomatic problem and could not be done without the approval of national authorities. Discipline in the North Korean military is strictly enforced and the hierarchy is thoroughly observed.

Aside from demanding money they must have intended to express discontent at something else. What message did the North Korean authorities want to convey to Beijing if they were indeed behind this incident?

The most likely scenario is that the abduction was carefully planned by the new leadership in Pyongyang in retaliation for China’s continuing criticism of North Korea’s April rocket launch and ongoing preparations for the nuclear test. And worse, Beijing recently permitted a number of North Korean defectors to leave China to seek asylum in South Korea. These actions must have angered North Korea’s leadership, and perhaps prompted them to ‘teach China a lesson’.

The timing of the incident supports this hypothesis. It coincided with joint US–ROK aerial exercises, which were held between 7 and 18 May. While these exercises take place on an annual basis, this year’s activities were of a particularly large scale. These war games not only send a warning message to the DPRK but also to China, serving to further strengthen the security cooperation between Beijing and Pyongyang. Paradoxically, joint US–ROK military exercises equip North Korea with extra leverage over China.

Beijing, however, is refusing to link the dots. So far the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs is labelling the incident a ‘fisheries case’ and searching for criminal gangs in Dandong. Clearly, Beijing is trying to soft-pedal the incident and avoid open antagonism with its long-term regional ally. All signs indicate that this incident will not negatively affect the strong political ties between the two countries. In a situation where the Chinese government prefers to maintain the status quo on the Korean Peninsula at all costs, such a minor incident will not force Beijing to end its support for the DPRK, a buffer state that separates its own borders from the US-allied South Korea.

Leonid Petrov is Lecturer in Korean Studies at the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, University of Sydney.