The current inter-Korean rapprochement has produced a wellspring of optimism in Northeast Asia at the prospect of a peaceful Korean Peninsula. But if the Peninsula as a whole becomes more deeply integrated with Northeast Asia economically, it is uncertain whether China and Russia will be collaborators or competitors.
Beijing and Moscow are nominal strategic partners but each country’s respective geopolitical interests and broader economic goals for the Eurasian landmass could limit Sino-Russian cohesion. Whether China and Russia will be partners or rivals in Northeast Asia may depend on infrastructure development.
From the mid-19th century, Russia turned an unprecedented measure of attention to Siberia and the Russian Far East to create a sphere of influence in East Asia. Like modern Russia, Imperial Russia at that time was a military power that lagged behind its European peers economically. Russia was keen on developing its presence in the Asia Pacific through logistics and infrastructure. The Trans-Siberian railroad was one way for Russia to maintain its influence. Russia also gained the right to lease the Chinese port at Lushun (then known as Port Arthur), a year-round warm water port.
Today, Russia once again aims to augment its economic influence in the Korean Peninsula. At the inter-Korean summit in April 2018, South Korean President Moon Jae-in presented his North Korean counterpart Kim Jong-un with a USB that reportedly included plans for economic collaboration between the two Koreas and Russia. Among the proposed projects for inter-Korean cooperation with Russia is an inter-Korean railway that would enter Russia’s Primorye province.
The prospect of economic openness in North Korea has also raised hopes for increased trade between North Korea and Northeast China, specifically the provinces of Liaoning, Jilin and Heilongjiang. In May 2018, Moon Jae-in and Chinese Premier Li Keqiang agreed that they should not only make demands of Pyongyang but also use ‘carrots’ to induce North Korea to denuclearise. One proposed method is constructing a railway from Seoul to China.
The idea of railways traversing the Korean Peninsula and connecting with lines in China or Russia has met with mixed reactions from Koreans themselves. Hanyang University Professor Han Hong-yeol spoke of the importance of developing infrastructure that connects the Korean Peninsula to China and Russia. On the other side, former North Korean ambassador to the United Kingdom Thae Yong-ho has expressed reservation over the feasibility of proposals to connect the Gyeongui Line and the East Sea line with a Russian rail system.
Beijing and Moscow’s respective interests in strengthening economic cooperation with the Korean Peninsula extend far beyond the confines of Northeast Asia. China and Russia’s economic interests connect Korea — territorially and geopolitically — to the Eurasian heartland. This prospect has emerged as Beijing and Moscow have initiated their own visions of Eurasian economic integration, namely the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) respectively. South Korea hopes to collaborate with both the BRI and EEU.
Manufactured goods comprise approximately 90 per cent of the European Union’s trade with South Korea. This underscores the importance for South Korea to have an effective way of transporting physical goods across long distances. Both Beijing and Moscow are proposing railways to connect their countries to a more deeply economically integrated Korean Peninsula.
But the construction of physical infrastructure is not in and of itself the greatest hurdle to connecting Korea with either Chinese or Russian territory. There are several rail lines that could connect the China–North Korea border city of Dalian to Xian, a proposed starting point of the New Silk Road. Meanwhile, North Korea and Russia agreed five years ago to strengthen their own rail connections. Today, North Korea’s rail system connects to Russian railways at Rason, which allows for a transfer to the Trans-Siberian railroad.
China and Russia will likely have to manage geopolitical contention over whether goods transported on a prospective trans-Korean rail line would travel through either Chinese or Russian territory. The Chinese and Russian governments have declared that they hope to establish a cooperative relationship between the EEU and BRI. But such cooperation is a long way off and not clearly defined.
The Sino-Russian relationship has thus far proven to be smooth in Northeast Asia. The future of Beijing and Moscow’s cooperative relationship, however, is less certain. Should the tensions between the two Koreas yield a season of peace, the Korean Peninsula will likely test the extent to which China and Russia emerge as either collaborators or contenders in an altered Northeast Asian landscape.
Anthony V Rinna is an analyst on Russian foreign policy in East Asia for the Sino-NK research group. He currently resides in South Korea.