The LDA was aimed at facilitating preliminary steps toward resolving the long-stalled nuclear issue and was hailed, albeit cautiously, as a major breakthrough. North Korea agreed to a moratorium on nuclear tests, long-range missile launches, and uranium enrichment activity at Yongbyon. It also agreed to allow IAEA inspectors back into the country — for the first time since 2009 — to monitor the moratorium on uranium enrichment. The US, for its part, agreed to provide North Korea with 240,000 metric tons of food aid.

But cracks in the agreement soon began to appear. On 16 March, North Korea’s space agency, the Korean Committee for Space Technology, announced plans for the satellite launch. The US and its allies, including Japan and South Korea, condemned the launch as an egregious violation of not only the LDA but also UN Security Council resolutions.

This single violation aside, the question remains whether North Korea will keep its commitments under the agreement, and it must be strongly encouraged to do so. If North Korea departs from the moratorium on nuclear testing and uranium enrichment, the international community must impose stronger sanctions. The crucial point here is whether China will do its utmost to prevent North Korea from carrying out further violations of the moratorium, including a possible third nuclear test. And in the event of further violations, will China agree to and fully implement sanctions?

At the same time, we must learn from this tumultuous episode, keeping three points in mind.

First, it is evident that negotiations must be conducted directly with North Korea’s power center and not necessarily the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. As is true in any negotiation process, it is crucial to interact with the right interlocutors. Dealing with a counterpart that cannot implement its end of a bargain is inherently a waste of time. Thus, if the US is serious about resolving the North Korean nuclear issue, it must negotiate with those entities that control its nuclear weapons. This means dealing not with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs but with the National Defense Council and establishing a streamlined and direct channel with North Korean negotiators who have unfettered access to Kim Jong-un, his inner ruling circle, and top military generals.

It is clear that the North Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs cannot give credible assurance on any measures relating to military matters and that any agreement negotiated with it regarding nuclear weapons will not be seriously implemented. Repeating this mistake will only result in further failed agreements destined to meet the same sorry fate as the 2005 agreement reached at the fourth round of the Six-Party Talks and the more recent LDA.

Second, policy consistency among the other five Six-Party nations is essential. In the absence of adequate coordination, the North Korean regime has effectively exploited policy differences and played the five governments against each other.

China is key in forging a coordinated approach. For its own geopolitical reasons, China’s approach toward North Korea is decidedly ambivalent, oscillating between reluctance to pressure North Korea too strongly and a desire to act as a responsible member of the international community. North Korea has clearly calculated that China will not side with Japan, South Korea, and the US, and this tacit support has been emboldening.

China’s lack of clear condemnation of the satellite launch demonstrates its inconsistent approach. As a permanent member of the UN Security Council, China approved Resolution 1874 in 2009. This resolution clearly forbids North Korea from conducting ‘any launch using ballistic missile technology.’ Given that the Unha carrier rocket North Korea uses for its satellites is virtually identical to its Taepodong long-range ballistic missile, satellite launches — whether intended for peaceful purposes or not — allow North Korea to improve its nuclear weapons delivery capacity and are a clear violation. Ultimately, China’s failure to condemn the satellite launch undermines the UN Security Council and the efforts of the other four Six-Party nations to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue.

Also crucial for forging policy consistency is trilateral cooperation among Japan, South Korea, and the US. It is imperative that these three nations work together and agree to do their utmost to see the issue resolved diplomatically. In doing so, they must present a united front to China and not allow North Korea to exploit policy differences.

Third, contingency planning is crucial given the uncertainties over future developments on the Korean Peninsula. Kim Jong-un is still consolidating his grip on power and the failure of the launch may have seriously undermined this process. We must assume that Kim Jong-un is still in a vulnerable position and a power struggle inside the military may not be out of the question.

It is therefore imperative that Japan, South Korea, and the US engage in trilateral contingency planning, outlining how the US-Japan alliance can be best utilised during any worst-case scenario. The precise role of the Japan Self-Defense Forces in any contingency plans must also be made absolutely clear. Trilateral cooperation must move beyond the previous pattern of hub-and-spokes talks conducted by the US with each of its allies and include substantive communication between Japan and South Korea and regular consultations by the three nations with both China and Russia.

A comprehensive, negotiated settlement is still the only practical way to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue. It has clearly become much more difficult to negotiate with North Korea now given the diplomatic fallout over this most recent episode. But taking our figurative bat and ball and going home to show displeasure over the satellite launch ultimately gives North Korea more time to develop its nuclear weapons and delivery capacity and allows it to edge ever closer toward de facto nuclear state status. To arrive at a place where we can forge a comprehensive settlement — through the Six-Party process — we must begin with small confidence-building steps and continue with informal bilateral negotiations to lay the groundwork. Recent efforts to this end, such as the LDA negotiations, should be continued, but this time it is critical for the US to conduct negotiations through the right channel.

Hitoshi Tanaka is a senior fellow at the Japan Center for International Exchange and chairman of the Institute for International Strategy at the Japan Research Institute. He previously served as Japan’s deputy minister for foreign affairs.

This article is an extract from East Asia Insights Vol. 7 No. 1 April 2012, which is available in full here, and is reprinted with the kind permission of JCIE.