In a recent piece in Foreign Affairs, Zbigniew Brzezinski, former US national security adviser, argued that the rising Asian powers should be drawn into joint security undertakings, leading in turn to a NATO-SCO council.
By extension, this provokes the rethink of a missing piece in the external relations of Central Asia, namely that of EU-SCO. Back in June 2007, the EU adopted its first strategy towards Central Asia: The EU and Central Asia: Strategy for a New Partnership. The EU wants to deal with the region as a whole but has found it difficult to apply a common policy, compounded by the fact that the Strategy covers agendas as diverse as human rights, energy and transport, and water management. In a progress report released in June 2008, the EU emphasised a dual approach (bilateral and regional) to the region. However, there is no clear policy towards the SCO.
Regional realities
In reality, the Central Asian states are very individual. There is no regional stance (except that expressed through the SCO) and each state acts on its own interest. Notable examples include the complex questions of sharing water resources and how to divide equitably other resources such as oil and gas. In April this year, they gathered for a summit of the International Fund for Saving the Aral Sea, which ended without a joint action plan. The upstream states of Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan are pursuing ambitious hydropower projects which will jeopardise water supply for downstream states. There is also no coordinated effort to tackle the wasteful irrigation along the main rivers, the Amu Darya and Syr Darya.
They also play the big powers – the US, Russia, China and Europe – to their own advantages. For example, in 2005, following the US and EU’s criticisms of the Andijon unrest in Uzbekistan, its president called for US forces to depart and received the backing of Russia and China. Earlier this year, Kyrgyzstan called for US forces to vacate from its Manas Airport, a key base for the war in Afghanistan. At the same time, it announced that Russia has pledged a US$2 billion aid package. In June, after the US agreed to triple its annual lease payment and spend more resources to combat terrorism and narcotics, it prolonged the lease, drawing criticisms from Russia.
Perhaps the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) can further demonstrate these balancing skills and internal conflicts. CSTO is an ill-fated Russian attempt to influence over Central Asia. At the beginning of August this year, Uzbekistan refused to sign on the CSTO rapid reaction force. It also expressed dissatisfaction over the establishment of a second Russian military base in Kyrgyzstan, saying that it would lead to ‘serious destabilisation of this vast region.’ Meanwhile, observers in Kyrgyzstan accused Uzbekistan of being jealous.
The SCO approach
Out of this complex web between the global powers and local states, the SCO seems to have emerged as a strong regional organisation. The SCO summit in Yekaterinburg this year saw a strengthening of pan-regional security mechanisms, including the SCO Counter-Terrorism Convention, the SCO Regulations on Political Diplomatic Measures and Mechanisms of Response to Events Jeopardising Regional Peace, Security and Stability, and the Agreement on Training of Officers for Counter-Terrorism Agencies. The SCO also presented a coherent voice following the Xinjiang violence: on July 10, it issued a statement to ‘further deepen practical cooperation in the field of fighting against terrorism, separatism, extremism and transnational organised crime for the sake of safeguarding regional security and stability’.
The SCO is effectively China’s instrument for influence in Central Asia. Its ingenuity lies in the fact that it concentrates on issues which can be resolved in a multilateral setting, and avoids those which are unlikely to gain pan-regional support. In Beijing’s calculus, the SCO has three main policy aims: establishing Central Asia as a bulwark against security threats from Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan; maintaining stability in the region to prevent terrorism and separatism from spilling over to Xinjiang; and access to energy resources.
The SCO Special Conference on Afghanistan in March 2009 reinforced the SCO as a platform for stability, calling for joint operations in combating terrorism, drug trafficking and organised crime, and for involving Afghanistan in building up capabilities in these areas. SCO member states also portrayed a united stance on Uyghur separatism following the Xinjiang incident. On these issues, the Central Asian states were eager allies, as they themselves are faced with similar problems of terrorism and local ethnic and religious rivalries. Also, the Afghanistan problem spilled into them several times in the 1990s.
On energy access, Central Asian states, with vast energy resources, and China, as a large consumer, are a perfect match. Chinese companies are actively building pipelines and transport infrastructures needed to bring those resources back to China. The SCO summit this year saw a strengthened role of the SCO Business Council and the Interbank Consortium to implement these multilateral projects. Again, Central Asian states are all too eager to collaborate.
A further ingenuity of the SCO lies in its flexibility and openness. Taking a non-confrontational approach, it does not obstruct member states to develop links with the West. Kazakhstan, for example, has managed to develop strong political and economic ties with Western nations while being an active SCO member. Nor is it opposed to expanding cooperation with the US and NATO in Afghanistan. It also provides a means for China and Russia to manage their tensions, while granting smaller states equality of partnership by upholding the UN principle of respect for sovereignty.
How should Europe engage
The priorities of Europe and the SCO are very much aligned. In December 2006, Frank-Walter Steinmeier, German foreign minister, identified three EU interests in Central Asia: the region’s strategic location bordering the instability areas of Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran; its struggle to contain Islamic fundamentalism; and its vast energy resources.
In the June 2008 evaluation of EU’s Central Asia Strategy, as well as this year’s SCO summit, there is little discussion of the possibility of a EU-SCO dialogue. But recognising that these issues are best dealt with in a multilateral way, as China has manifested through the SCO, Europe should establish a partnership with the SCO. Developed in the wrong way, Central Asia could bring to Europe problems of terrorism, disrupted energy supplies and illegal immigrants.
On security matters, the EU and SCO share a common interest in combating terrorist networks based there. Several European states are participating in the NATO-led mission in Afghanistan. A strong EU-SCO dialogue could hold the key to a long-term solution for Afghanistan. The SCO, as an arc of stability in the north of Eurasia, is the ideal partner in promoting border security against threats of insurgency, drug trafficking, organised crime and terrorism.
On energy matters, as Europe and China are both large consumers, both are eyeing Central Asia as a source of energy diversification. Ongoing EU initiatives like the 3,300km Nabucco pipeline and the ‘Southern Corridor – New Silk Route’ strategy unveiled this year attempt to bring energy resources to Europe. Given that the EU and China are likely to compete over oil and gas from the region in future, they need a strategy for managing this potential rivalry without jeopardising energy security concerns.
SCO is sometimes seen as a ‘club for autocrats and dictators.’ Its member states’ neglect of human rights, democracy and environmental problems is indeed a limitation on EU-SCO cooperation. Yet, the war in Afghanistan, the failure of NATO in bringing stability to the region, and the resurgence of terrorism and extremism loom over the security situation in Central Asia.
True, issues of democracy, human rights and good governance cannot be dealt with through the SCO at present. There are other important bilateral channels. But the SCO is a multilateral, non-confrontational and clever way of tackling the region’s most urgent problems. It should be a key part of EU’s dual approach. A positive EU-SCO cooperation could make a real impact on regional stability and development, creating the goodwill for further democratic reforms and fulfilling EU’s long-term regional ambition: not a new balance of power, but a new world of law, peace and security.