Those challenges have to be met at a time when the prestige of the United States has been badly damaged and its power weakened. The fundamental foreign policy framework for the Obama administration can be summarized in the following key characteristics.
- A change in the nature of major threats facing the nation to a focus that is transnational. Those threats must be met in a comprehensive manner that relies on economics, development, diplomacy and security rather than simply military power.
- Securing peace and stability in the world will require not only depending on NATO, the Japan-U.S. alliance and the U.S.-South Korea alliance, but also cooperation with the newly emerging major powers of China, India and Brazil. Every vehicle that can be mobilized–alliances, the United Nations and multinational forces–must be used.
- Diplomatic solutions will be pursued through “persuasion first” as Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton stated, meaning a greater reliance on multilateral discussions and negotiations. The administration will strive for a results-oriented approach that involves cooperation with nations to act decisively.
Amid that framework, where will the Japan-U.S. relationship be positioned?
At the hearing of the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee to confirm her nomination as secretary of state, Clinton emphasized that “our alliance with Japan is a cornerstone of American policy in Asia, essential to maintaining peace and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region.”
The comment likely drew a sigh of relief from those in the Japanese government and the ruling Liberal Democratic Party who were worried the new administration would lean toward greater emphasis on China at the expense of downplaying Japan.
Still, there are some within the Japanese government who express concerns that Clinton’s statement was nothing more than “lip service,” while others warn that the economic crisis could upgrade the Sino-American relationship to an economic alliance.
As a debtor nation, the United States needs China and has “to make sure that they (the Chinese) continue buying our debt,” as Clinton said at her hearing.
The key in this area will be policy dialogue among Japan, the United States and China on economic growth, a correction of imbalances in current accounts and currency stability. Regarding the issue of North Korea’s nuclear weapons programs, Clinton indicated she would continue with the six-party talks framework, which she described as “a vehicle for us to exert pressure on North Korea in a way that is more likely to alter their behavior.”
She hinted at the possibility of intending to expand those talks from a negotiation process to have North Korea abandon its nuclear program to a common foothold for constructing a wider-ranging peace and negotiating with Pyongyang.
Rather than simply depending on talks between the United States and North Korea, it will become even more important to nurture a regional approach involving Japan, China and South Korea.
Asian regional cooperation will also be important in facing the economic crisis. Japan, China and South Korea can no longer maintain their growth strategies that depend too much on exports to the United States. Economic growth in Asia, not to mention peace and stability in the region, will be essential for overcoming the crisis.
Japan will be further tested on whether it can maintain cordial relations with its neighbors and whether it can be a force for stability in the region.
The United States is not satisfied with the half-hearted approach of Japan toward achieving stability and development in Afghanistan and the relocation of the Marine Corps Air Station Futenma in Okinawa Prefecture.
Richard Lawless, a former U.S. deputy undersecretary of defense, warns that with “the lack of assertiveness and self-confidence that accompanies Japan’s seemingly ready acceptance of self-marginalization within the region, and globally, the Alliance is trending toward that of a ‘subprime’ relationship.”
Japanese officials, for their part, are concerned about the incongruity of positions between the two nations vis-a-vis North Korea policy as well as a perception gap about possible threats arising from a China with a stronger naval presence in the East China Sea and an expanded nuclear capability.
There are Republicans in the United States who have already raised concerns about the new administration’s Asia policy.
Michael Green, who served as National Security Council senior director for Asia under President George W. Bush, said, “The basic thrust of the Obama team’s Asia policy is too much focused on the transnational threats and tends to neglect the traditional balance-of-power threats–in particular, the rise of China and the associated challenge to U.S. policy and to the U.S.-Japan alliance. Yet, Asia is on many fronts still in the 19th century, and this is something which we cannot ignore.”
However, the Obama administration’s fundamental recognition that the present threats being faced are transnational is not mistaken. It is also clear that the new administration expects Japan to provide a non-military role and assets to deal with such threats.
As L. Gordon Flake, executive director of the Mansfield Foundation, said, “while the U.S. commitment to the alliance may be of concern, a more immediate challenge will be questions over Japan’s ability to meet the expectations set for it.”
During the Cold War, Japan and the United States constructed the concepts for its alliance with a focus on the threat of military conflict.
Now is the time for the two nations to advance the alliance so that it can be effective against threats arising during times of peace.
There is a need for a redefinition of the nonmilitary, complementary roles to be played by both sides during peacetime while bearing in mind the changes in the nature of the diverse threats that are spreading globally.
During the Bush administration, with its focus on military action, Japan’s role could be fulfilled to some extent by providing bases to the U.S. military.
Under the Obama administration, which emphasizes smart power, the focus will be on nonmilitary, peacetime cooperation.
Creating a framework for alliance cooperation during peacetime will prepare for the utilization of an alliance that functions during a military conflict.
For example, Japan and the United States should seek to develop a “green alliance” with the two nations working to roll back global warming as well as a “humanitarian assistance alliance” that involves relief efforts during major natural disasters.
In Afghanistan, the two nations should cooperate in nation-building with Tokyo and Washington contributing that for which each side is best suited in a complementary manner.
What should provide a valuable foothold on that occasion is Japan’s assistance projects aimed at establishing peace in Afghanistan that have involved agencies, such as the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), working to pave major highways, construct airports, build schools and provide homes for refugees and evacuees.
JICA will likely become the most important strategic base for Japanese diplomacy.
Within the postwar Japan-U.S. relationship, there have been examples in which, with the United States embarking on major social reform, Japan has followed suit in a similar conceptual and policy direction while building up a new core of economic and diplomatic policy.
Good examples include the Kennedy administration’s Keynesian strategy of “lift-all-boats” economic growth during the 1960s while then Prime Minister Hayato Ikeda was pushing Japan to become an economic superpower with his income-doubling plan.
During the 1980s, the Reagan administration unveiled a new Schumpeterian reformist strategy, while then Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone was switching to a course of converting Japan into an international state while utilizing the power of the private sector.
We now face a similar frontier in which calls for change once again resonate in the two nations.
However, despite the radical changes in the global environment, including the emergence of the new Obama administration, Japan has been unable to sufficiently define a framework for global peace, stability and order and the role Japan should play in that framework.
The LDP is unable to present such a framework, while the main opposition Minshuto (Democratic Party of Japan) is incapable of clearly defining such a framework.
A new age has arrived. But whether Japan is able to join in that new age will depend on its own sense of history.
This article also appeared in Asahi Shimbun on January 30th, 2009.